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Taking Wright Seriously: Of Judicial
Discretion, Jurisprudents, and the
Chief Justice
By JOHN BILYEU OAKLEY*

Introduction
"The better part of valor," boasted Falstaff, "is discretion.' Shakespeare's character was, however, better noted for his indiscretions, and was
congratulating himself on the wisdom of having played dead on the battlefield, the better to stay alive. During the Chief Justiceship of Donald
Wright, the Supreme Court of California was hardly given to shrinking from
the fray. The court, happily, remained very much alive notwithstanding its
disregard of Falstaff's example.
The forte of Chief Justice Wright, and many of the triumphs of the
court under his flag, lay in the field of criminal procedure. He performed
superlatively the task of leading the Supreme Court of California in deciding
such cases correctly: that is, with courage, without cant, and with due
regard for the social as well as individual consequences. His accomplishments attest that, for high courts in hard cases of criminal procedure, the
better part of discretion is valor.
One cannot, these days, address judicial discretion without paying heed
to the intense debate among legal philosophers as to whether such discretion
properly exists at all in any meaningful sense. I propose to attend to that
debate, and perhaps to add a footnote to it, by examining it in light of a case
which falls at its edge and yet raises issues central to jurisprudents' concern
over the proper scope of judicial discretion. I begin by sketching in broad
strokes the basic outline of the jurisprudential debate, including the nature of
@ John Bilyeu Oakley, 1977.
* B.A., 1969, University of California, Berkeley; J.D., 1972, Yale University; Acting
Professor of Law, University of California, Davis. Law Clerk to Chief Justice Wright, 1972-73
and 1974-75. Although the views expressed are his alone, the author wishes to express his
appreciation to Professor Edgar Bodenheimer for his comments upon the jurisprudential
sections of this article, and for making available in manuscript form his forthcoming article, see
note 8 infra.
1. W. SHAKESPEARE, KING HENRY IV, pt. 1,act 5, sc. 4, line 120.
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"hard cases," the varying meanings of "discretion," and the evolution of
the debate. I present in more detail and with some comment a pr6cis of the
current terms of the debate. Against this backdrop I pose a study of a
classically hard case, People v. Coleman,2 into which I incorporate references to several other hard cases of criminal procedure. Based on this case
study, I contend that for reasons not adequately accounted for in the
jurisprudential debate over judicial discretion, problems of adjudicatory
procedure, especially in criminal cases, are legitimately within the province
of quasi-legislative judicial discretion. It is this sort of discretion, I conclude, of which Chief Justice Wright was past master.

I. Definitional Background
A. Hard Cases
The starting point for discussing judicial discretion is the somewhat
elusive notion of the "hard case." The definition of a hard case is itself not
troublesome. Hard cases are those which, assuming agreement as to the
facts, still afford rational grounds for dispute among equally competent
lawyers as to the proper legal result. This definition would presumably be
accepted even by Professor Ronald Dworkin, who maintains-in his inspiringly entitled collection of essays, Taking Rights Seriously'-that, at least
as a philosophical matter, there is a uniquely right legal answer to virtually
every case, no matter now "hard" the case may appear to be in terms of
having to decide among reasonable, alternative resolutions. 4 Thus Dworkin
2. 13 Cal. 3d 867, 553 P.2d 1024,120 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1975), noted in The Supreme Court of
California 1974-1975, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 239, 516 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Supreme Court].
3. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) [hereinafter cited as DWORKIN]. Most
of the chapters of this book appeared earlier in various periodicals. See, e.g., Dworkin, Hard
Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Hard Cases], Dworkin, The Model of
Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14 (1967); Dworkin, Social Rules and Legal Theory, 81 YALE L.J. 855
(1972); Dworkin, The De Funis Case: The Right to go to Law School, 23 NEW YORK REV. OF
BOOKS 29-33 (Feb. 5, 1976). Only chapters twelve and thirteen are new. See DWORKIN, supra, at
XV.

4. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 99-130, 279-90. Dworkin does admit to the philosophical
possibility of there being a "tie" between alternative answers to a hard case, so that in such a
hard case there is indeed no one right answer. Id. at 284-86. However, he contends that in a
very advanced legal system possessing a sophisticated body of legal rules and precedents,
"the antecedent probability of a tie [compared to the probability of judges erroneously
deciding a tie exists because that decisionmaking option is allowed to them] is very much lower;
indeed it might well be so low as to justify a further ground rule. . . which instructs judges to
eliminate ties from the range of answers they might give. That instruction does not deny the
theoretical possibility of a tie, but it does suppose that. . . judges will. . . come to think that
one side or the other has, all things considered and marginally, the better of the case. This
further instruction will be rational if the antecedent probability of error in a judicial decision
seems to be greater than the antecedent probability that some case will indeed be, in fact, a tie,
and if there are advantages of finality or other political advantages to be gained by denying the
possibility of tie cases at law." Id. at 286-87.

Fall 1977]

JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND JURISPRUDENCE

himself defines a hard case-notwithstanding his conviction that it has a
single philosophically right answer-as a "case in which one answer
5
cannot be proved in a way that can only be challenged by the irrational."
The distinguishing characteristic of a hard case is, then, that able lawyers do
not agree on the right result that the law should produce in the case. Even the
theoretical existence of a single right answer does not detract from the
difficulty of a hard case, because Dworkin himself seems willing to concede
that as a practical fact "that right answer is locked in legal philosopher's
heaven, inaccessible to laymen, lawyers and judges alike. Each can have
only his own opinion, and the opinion of the judge comes no more warranted for truth than the opinion of anyone else.' '6
The elusiveness of the hard case notion lies not in defining hard cases
in the abstract, but in deciding how to apply that definition to specific cases.
What are the grounds for dispute in a particular case and how charitable a
standard of rationality is to be applied to these grounds? Properly defined,
are hard cases commonplace or extraordinary in our legal system? Such
questions have, with one exception, 7 received scant attention in the recent
spate of commentary on judicial discretion that Dworkin's views have
provoked. 8 Yet, whether hard cases are routine or unusual would seem to
have an important bearing on the debate over how hard cases are (or ought to
be) decided.
Justice Cardozo, for one, appears to have vacillated in his assessment
of the predominance of hard cases. He began his famous series of lectures
on the judicial process by denying that the task of deciding cases is a matter
of daily routine susceptible to easy description. 9 Indeed, he went on,
5. Id. at 287. Dworkin was here referring specifically to a "controversial" case, but
appears to have used this term interchangeably with "hard" case.

6. Id. at 280. See note 68 infra.
7. See Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligationofa Judge: The HartiDworkinDispute, 75

MICH. L. REV. 473, 484-88 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Soper].
8. See, e.g., Bodenheimer, Hart, Dworkin, and the Problem of Judicial Lawmaking
Discretion, I1 GA. L. REV. 1143 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Bodenheimer]; Greenawalt, Discre-

tion and JudicialDecision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters That Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 359 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Greenawalt]: Hart, Law in the Perspective ofPhilosophy:
1776-1976, 51 N.Y.U.L. REv. 538 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Hart, Law in Perspective];Soper,

supra note 7; Note, Dworkin's "Rights Thesis," 74 MicH. L. REv. 1167 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Rights Thesis]. These articles all take account of the views expressed by Dworkin in his

1975 article, HardCases, supra note 3; Professor Greenawalt's article appeared in advance of
Professor Dworkin's book but took note of the development of Dworkin's theories as expressed in "unpublished writings" and "a number of lectures." Greenawalt, supra, at 360 n.9,

386 n.65. See also Reynolds, Dworkin as Quixote, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 574 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Reynolds]; Note, Understanding the Model of Rules: Toward a Reconciliation of
Dworkin and Positivism, 81 YALE L.J. 912 (1972); and the list of articles supplied by Dworkin
himself, DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 46 n.2. This body of commentary is predominantly critical

of the conclusions drawn by Dworkin while praising the insights offered by his arguments.
9. B. CARDOZO, The Nature of the JudicialProcess, in SELECTED WRIINGS OF BENJAMIN
NATHAN CARDOZO 108 (M. Hall ed. 1947).
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"judge-made law [is a] strange compound which is brewed daily in the
cauldron of the courts," and to which all judges contribute. 10 Yet, later in his
lectures, he cautioned that in "countless litigations, the law is so clear that
judges have no discretion. They have the right to legislate within gaps, but
often there are no gaps."i
On the other hand, Professor H.L.A. Hart, the leading advocate of the
theory of "legal positivism"' 2 that Dworkin criticizes in his book, 13 has
declared forcefully that hard cases are the exception, not the rule of the
judicial process:
[T]here are, indeed, areas of conduct where much must be left to
be developed by courts or officials striking a balance, in the light of
circumstances, between competing interests which vary in weight
from case to case. None the less, the life of the law consists to a
very large extent in the guidance both of officials and private
individuals by determinate rules which, unlike the applications of
variable standards
do not require from them a fresh judgment from
4
case to case.'
In view of his assertions that hard cases actually have right answers which a
judge must strive to discern by perspicacious thought and review of all
relevant aspects of the legal system, Professor Dworkin would seem to share
the belief that truly hard cases which do not yield their intractability under
15
sustained analysis are relatively rare.
I am inclined to take a contrary position. When one limits consideration
to cases actually adjudicated, rather than cases merely filed or otherwise
formally added to a court's docket, I suspect that hard cases constitute a
substantial and increasing proportion of cases submitted in whole or in part
to judicial decision. The situation is admittedly complicated because, as
Justice Cardozo noted, the real controversy in many lawsuits is the underlying facts themselves rather than the law applicable to those facts; factual
disputes, however, present their own problems of judicial discretion beyond
the scope of this discussion.' 6 Apart from that, the revolution in civil
10. Id. at 109.
11. Id. at 160.
12. For an analysis of the concept of legal positivism, see notes 40-43 and accompanying
text infra.
13. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at ix. At least one commentator has characterized the rela-

tionship between Hart and Dworkin as an adversarial debate. See Soper, supra note 7, at 476 &
n.il.

14. H. HART, THE CoNcEPr OF LAW 132 (1961) [hereinafter cited as HART].
15. See note 4 supra.
16. It should be emphasized that, in an artificial sense, hard cases involve doubtful law

rather than doubtful facts. I am not here concerned with the judicial role in resolving disputes of
fact. Right or wrong in that context is assessed in terms of accuracy rather than ethics, and
there are generally only crude means of verification. The fact finder may thus have great
practical latitude in refusing to follow instructions of law or in disregarding honest intuition.
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procedure that has occurred with the advent of the federal rules and their
many state analogues has greatly reduced the purely factual disputes actually
tried by a court. Once modern discovery devices have identified the genuine
disputes of fact between litigants, the potential cost and delay to be encountered in the resolution of those differences by trial creates great pressure on
contemporary litigants to negotiate a settlement of such disputes.17
I do not mean to contend that judges of courts of law only rarely
confront an "easy" case. In particular, the gravity of being charged with a
crime leads us to demand judicial administration of criminal adjudication,
even when the issues are primarily factual.' 8 In some civil cases, too, the
Whether out of fear of the consequences of placing such practical discretion in the hands of
judges, or out of hope of its use by sympathetic peers, the delegation of fact-finding to persons
other than judges has a hallowed place in our legal system. Of course, judges as well as juries
may be swayed by subjective factors in the finding of facts, see Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80
U. PA. L. REv. 17, 35-36 (1931), and such subjectivity may affect a trial judge's resolution of
legal issues. The extent of this problem, however, is beyond the scope of this commentary. In
another sense the trial court's discretion concerning facts is germane, however. Rules of
procedure have a vital bearing on findings of fact, and even when juries rather than judges are
charged with ascertaining the facts, rulings regarding evidence and other aspects of procedure
will have a profound influence on the substance of those findings.
The standards governing these rulings, especially in the area of civil discovery, often
warrant wide discretion to the trial judge. In other areas, such as the order of presentation of
evidence, the notion of deference to the "sound discretion of the trial judge" is a virtual totem
of appellate review; in still other areas, such as the admissibility of evidence, the imperceptible
influence of procedural rulings on findings of fact allow the mistakes of trial courts to be swept
en masse under the rug of appellate review by the doctrine of harmless error. Thus the trial
judge will confront many controversial questions concerning the proper exercise of "discretion." Although such hard cases do not yield controlling precedent in the same fashion as do
hard cases before appellate courts, certain expectations attach to the fact that they are decided
by judges, even trial judges. I believe that the litigants are entitled to have these hard cases
decided in the same spirit as those resolved at the appellate court level.
17. Any census of hard cases in trial courts must take account of the many difficult
questions of adjudicatory procedure that even a primarily factual case can present to a trial
judge as it proceeds to and through trial. See note 16 supra. Moreover, consideration must be
given to the recurring yet often intractable legal issues that primarily factual cases have the
potential to raise at some point-from demurrer to judgment notwithstanding the verdictwhere even assuming adverse resolution of the factual dispute one side claims to be entitled to
judgment "as a matter of law." The intractability of such issues stems not only from the
difficulty of distinguishing questions of fact from questions of law, see generallyF. JAMES & G.
HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 7.3, 7.10 (2d ed. 1977), but also from the subtle differences
between the basic tests for the legal sufficiency of the allegations or the evidence and the degree
to which the judge may consider the credibility of the evidence actually adduced, see id. §§ 2.9,
7.11, 7.13, 7.22. Even the seemingly archetypal factual considerations placed before a trial
judge by a motion for a new trial because the verdict was against the weight of the'evidence are
edged by difficult questions of the law governing the court's discretion, if a judge does more
than sit in the jury box and tries as well to find some benchmark, in Dworkinian terms of
institutional history and political morality, by which to gauge the propriety of judicial intrusion
into the "province of the jury." See id. § 7.20.
18. See, e.g., Gordon v. Justice Court, 12 Cal. 3d 323, 325-26, 525 P.2d 72, 73, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 632, 633 (1974), cert. denied. 420 U.S. 938 (1975): "We are confronted here with the
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presence of a judge may seem imperative because an easy case in point of
law ranks high on some scale of consequentiality. 19 Aside from criminal
trials and civil cases presenting special circumstances, however, I submit
that the adjudication of easy cases is increasingly becoming ancillary to the
judicial function in modern America. 20
Thus I suggest that the problem of how judges decide hard cases is best
approached from the perspective that hard cases are commonplace. However controversial this perspective may be when the focus is upon trial courts
and courts which hear appeals as of right, it seems difficult to dispute in the
context of a court of last resort that has "discretionary" control of its own
docket. 2 1 With the possible exception of cases in which the court's imquestion whether the current practice of allowing nonattorney judges to preside over criminal
trials of offenses'punishable by a jail sentence, as is the situation in over 60 percent of the
justice courts in California, violates the constitutional rights of the defendants in those proceedings. We have decided that this practice does violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, and that henceforth defendants in such courts
are entitled to have an attorney judge preside over all criminal proceedings involving charges
which carry the possibility of a jail sentence, unless such right is waived by defendant or his
counsel."
19. The most familiar example of a "scale of consequentiality" is of course the jurisdictional amount. Not only do jurisdictional amounts determine the type of court a case may be
tried in, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970) (diversity case in federal court requires an amount
in controversy in excess of $10,000), but also whether a case is tried to a judge at all, see, e.g., 6
B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Appeal §§ 18, 24 (2d ed. 1971), describing the
prior system of California justice courts, wherein nonattorney judges could try cases involving
only $1,000 in damages or less. This system has been completely revised by the state legislature,
so that today justice courts have jurisdiction concurrent with that enjoyed by municipal courts,
see CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 83, 86 (West Supp. 1977) and all future vacancies on the former
tribunals must be filled exclusively by attorneys, see CAL. GOV'T CODE § 71701 (West 1976).
20. Decisions truly compelled by law are ministerial, more properly the work of clerks
than judges. Most easy cases cannot be decided by clerks, however, for two reasons. First,
there may be a dispute as to the operative facts which must be resolved through some factfinding process performed or administered by one knowledgeable in the law that governs that
process. Second, perception of the correct legal answer may be easy only to one well-versed in
the relevant doctrines of law. Thus, our society is developing a class of intermediate adjudicators of easy cases, legal technicians sufficiently cognizant of the law to translate accurately its abstract mandates into specific legal imperatives governing the conduct of persons and
institutions. '
These functionaries, however much they yearn to be called judges rather than arbitrators,
referees, hearing officers, commissioners, and the like, do not truly operate in a judicial fashion
as I conceive it. They do have a practical discretion with regard to findings of fact, but this is a
function which we have always been prepared to delegate to persons or entities other than
judges. As for questions of law, these essentially administrative adjudicators are distinguishable from judges because of the narrowness of their jurisdiction, the specialized technicality of their expertise, the insecurity of their tenure, their general lack of insulation from the
institutions, personalities, and subject matter with which they deal, and above all, by the very
tendentiousness of the law which they construe and administer, law that combines to channel
administrative adjudication to desired ends while discouraging any eddies of ambiguity as to the
law's true direction.
21. The Supreme Court of California has original jurisdiction of appeals in capital cases.
CAL. CONsT. art. VI, § 11. Such appeals are, by statute, automatic. CAL. PENAL CODE §1239(b)
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primatur is needed in an undemanding case,22 or when issues clear to the
court have proved troublesome to the lower courts ,23 the Supreme Court of
California does not hear easy cases.
B. The Meanings of Discretion
Even in the midst of the hard case debate, no one denies that hard cases
call for the exercise of judicial discretion. The issue is the nature and
dimension of that discretion. Is it a "weak" discretion, in the sense that by
definition the law is difficult to discern and apply in hard cases, and that by
virtue of their position judges are the ones empowered to make the choice
from among the reasonable but competing alternatives argued to the court?
Or is it a "strong" discretion, in the sense that hard cases evidence gaps in
the law which both free judges from constraint to reach particular, legallymandated results and invite them to fashion such judicially-created gapfilling law as best serves the judges' extra-legally inspired ends? 24
Meaningful discussion of the extent of judicial discretion in the decision of hard cases assumes that judges do abide by the law. 2 There is,
(West Supp. 1977). The court may also exercise original jurisdiction by issuance of writs of
habeas corpus or extraordinary writs in the nature of mandamus, certiorari, or prohibition.
CAL. CONsT. art. VI, § 10. The court's principal means of exercising jurisdiction is by granting a
hearingbefore the supreme court of a case pending before or decided by the courts of appeal.
CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 12. The procedure for granting a hearing is comparable to the United
States Supreme Court's certiorari practice, and is governed by CAL. RULE OF COURT 29,
providing: "(a) A hearing in the Supreme Court . . . will be ordered (1)where it appears
necessary to secure uniformity of decision or the settlement of important questions of law
22. See, e.g., California Educ. Facilities Auth. v. Priest, 12 Cal. 3d 593,598,526 P.2d 513,
516, 116 Cal. Rptr. 361, 364 (1974) (exercise of original jurisdiction in issuing a writ of mandate
ordering the state treasurer to perform the acts necessary to permit the sale of the bonds of the
petitioning authority).
23. See, e.g., People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884, 889-94, 506 P.2d 232, 235-38, 106 Cal. Rptr.
408, 411-14 (1973).
24. See DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 31-33. But see Reynolds, supra note 8, at 576-87.
Actually, Dworkin assigns two meanings to the term "weak discretion." One refers to a
situation in which a decisionmaker must apply external standards but must exercise judgment in
doing so, rather than operating mechanically. The other refers to a situation in which some
official has final authority to make a decision and cannot be reviewed and reversed by any other
official. This latter definition will not be discussed in this commentary. See note 25 infra.
25. One sense of discretion is excluded from the debate: discretion in the sense of
unreviewable power to make a decision. The timeless problem of quis custodiet ipsos custodes?-who will watch over the watchmen?-is really beyond the scope of jurisprudence. The
idea of a functioning system of law presupposes a social effort to control or conform human
conduct by some sort of means, however mutable, flexible, or ambiguous, and thus presupposes that there will be institutions and persons charged with determining the lawfulness of
particular conduct. See I R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 15-16 (1959) [hereinafter cited as POUND].
In the Anglo-American legal culture those institutions and persons include in the first instance,
police, judges, jurors, hearing officers, and a legion of others from school principals to building
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furthermore, substantial agreement on the concept2 6 of what the law is, at
least in modern Anglo-American culture.2 7 In generalized form, the law is a
body of standards which, having come into being by the accretion of custom
inspectors. There are of course successive levels of'reviewing institutions and persons, but
there must ultimately be a level at which legal, as opposed to political, review stops. At that
ultimate level there is manifest power to disregard "the law" without legal sanction, but this
"discretion" to disregardthat which is legally required is wholly different from a discretion to
determine that which is legally required. To the extent that courts of last resort exercise their
power simply to disregard the law, jurisprudential debate about how the content of the law is to
be determined is irrelevant.
26. It is essential to an enlightened discussion of what we conceive of as law to distinguish
semantically between concepts and conceptions. Dworkin has drawn the distinction well. See
DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 134-37. We might well agree on our concept of law as a philosophical
entity. Nevertheless, our individual conceptions of what the law decrees in particular situations
may vary radically. These variances may be quite reasonable, notwithstanding our equal
expertise in law and legal philosophy, and yet do not preclude our continued agreement on the
concept of law from which each of us derives our idiosyncratic perspectives.
For instance, we could agree that the law is, in concept, the will of God. Thus, while our
jurisprudential debates would then assume a theological cast, our conceptions of what it was
exactly that God willed might differ dramatically. Nevertheless, assuming that we could agree
in a general way on what we meant by God, our concept of the law would be the same.
27. Concepts of law employed by functioning legal systems have not varied greatly
throughout history. Three basic themes predominate: law as supernatural force or will, antecedent to and omnipotent over humanity; law as a set of universal values inherent in human
society and the physical world; and law as the will of powerful mortals imposed upon less
powerful mortals. The concept of law as divine will has always been popular, sometimes
operating through the media of various physical phenomena. There have also been many
adherents to more agnostic notions of "natural" law, derived from logic, history, and observation of the physical world, which, while not originating from a deistic source, are nonetheless
endowed with the ethical overtones of "higher" law, in that they posit immutable principles to
which human law should conform. Concepts of natural law, however, generally differ from
theories of law based on divine will by being strictly normative, and enforced (if at all) by
enlightened and conscientious mortals. See generally E. BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 4, 31-35
(rev. ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE].
Less transcendent theories of law have also abounded, culminating in the empirical
concept of law denominated as "positivism." See notes 38-43 and accompanying text infra.
Classical positivists discerned both power and law as emanating from the barrel of a gun, at
least if the one brandishing that gun qualified as an agent of the state.
Finally, there has been the occasional example of law as physical power merged into law as
divine will. It is commonplace, of course, for worldly rulers to claim that God's hand has guided
them to the throne, and that their acts bespeak God's will. Such invocations of divine power
generally relegated the ruler's role to one of merely a medium for the Almighty. To pretend
otherwise is dangerous, for if the belief in God is strong, a ruler's arrogation of godly status may
be seen as an act of impiety sufficient to shift divine favor to a humbler vassal. Such diverse
rulers as Louis XIV, Montezuma, and Caesar Augustus propagated the cult of self-deification
to the extent that the governing concept of law in their societies became synonymous with their
own personal wills. One should not make the mistake of presuming that even such judges as an
Earl Warren or a Donald Wright possessed the freedom of impulsive action open to the
aforementioned emperors.
We may recognize and occasionally regret that the unreviewable discretion vested in the
judges of our highest courts allows them to act upon conceptions of law which differ from ours,
but this does not mean that their actions are premised upon a concept of law as an expression of
their own individual wills.
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or acts of authoritative articulation, we are prepared to recognize as legitimate. By "legitimate" it is meant that we feel "obligated" as well as
"obliged" to obey the law.2 8 The law is not just the command of some
gangster or warlord with the power of arms, but sets "a standard of behavior
that has a call on its subject beyond the threat that may enforce it."29 Thus
there is substantial agreement that the law is a basic set of guidelines for
ordering our lives and social institutions, primarily by our personal efforts at
compliance with the law, and secondarily by the social enforcement of law
under the ultimate control of the judges of our courts of law. The contemporary debate is over the nature of the standards which constitute law, and
the nature of the discretion which such standards leave to judges in applying
the law.
H. Origins of the Jurisprudential Debate
A. Historical Development of Jurisprudential Attitudes Toward Judicial Discretion
Upon this common ground, then, is waged the battle of the hard case.
The opposing forces are each colored by history, and the arguments exchanged have roots traceable to the very origins of human civilization. 30 For
our purposes, however, we need retreat no further than 1598, the year
Falstaff first addressed discretion from the stage, and the year a lowly case
involving sewer assessments gave Sir Edward Coke the opportunity to
declare that officials empowered to act "according to their discretions, ...
ought to be limited and bound with the rule of reason and law. For discretion
is a science or understanding to discern between falsity and truth, between
wrong and right, between shadows and substance, between equity and
colourable glosses and pretences, and to not do according to their wills and
private affections . . . . '31
It is a wholly different matter whether judges may occasionally decide cases purely on the
basis of their personal predilections rather than in accordance with their conscious conceptions

of the dictates of law. The suspicion of such malfeasance assumes that the judge is operating
under some concept of law other than the will of the judge. The sin of such judges is not heresy
but false homage. To conceal the unlawfulness of spurious decisions, they offer colorable
conceptions of law as rationalizations. Because as judges they have the power to act upon any
conception which is rationally consistent with our governing concept of law, we are left with the
choice of accepting the suspect decisions as rational although (in our opinion) wrong, or
concluding that the irrationality of such a decision is indicative of individual derangement and

demands the removal of the judge in question.
28. See HART, supra note 14, at 79-88.

29. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 19-20. Use of the term "standards" is meant to leave open
the question of whether the law consists not only of "rules" but also of "principles" and

"policies," terms which are commonplace in contemporary jurisprudential usage. See notes 5556, 65-68, 75-78, and accompanying text infra.

30. See Bodenheimer, supra note 8, at 1143-44.
31. Rooke's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 209, 210 (C.P. 1598) (footnotes omitted). At the time this
case was decided, Coke was serving as Attorney General. In 1606, he became Lord Chief
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Coke's characterization of discretion as a matter of procedural purity
and dexterity rather than substantive volition underscored his conviction that
discretion was always scireper legem quid sit justum: to discern that which
is just according to law.32 However conferred, by statute, ruling, or claim of
right, and by whomever exercised, be it king, judge, or sewer commissioner, discretion demanded the application, not the generation of law. Although Coke did not believe in natural law in some simplistic, apolitical, and
highly intuitive sense, he did believe in a technically complex higher law, a
common law of custom and "artificial reason" 33 that was part of the
national fabric and to which sovereign and citizen were subject alike.3 4 This
law was immutable, at least at the hands of the legislature or monarch, and
35
the courts were charged with enforcing it.
As a judge and commentator upon whose writings the lawyers of the
American Revolution were raised, Coke had a profound influence over the
concept and content of the law applied in the American colonies and, later,
states. 36 In his own country Coke's compilations of law also had an enduring
influence but his concept of the nature of law was less lasting; Coke himself
was removed from the bench for continually dissenting from King James'
37
claim to the absolute power of a royal "prerogative" unbounded by law.
The contest for hegemony between the monarchy and the legislature was
settled by revolution and restoration, not by courts of common law. In
Coke's time it had served the ends of Parliament to accept the constraints of
Justice of the Court of Common Pleas and, seven years later, was appointed as Lord Chief
Justice of the Court of King's Bench. In 1580 he began systematically recording cases that he
witnessed; the first volume of his bound reports appeared in 1600.
32. Keighly's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1136, 1138 (C.P. 1609). In this case Coke as Chief Justice
of the Court of Common Pleas adopted qua judge statements he had made qua reporter in

stating the basis for the ruling in Rooke's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 209 (C.P. 1598). See note 31
supra. It should be noted that although Rooke's Case and Keighly's Case both involved the

statutory discretion to set assessments conferred upon commissioners of sewers, in the latter
case Coke styled his description of discretion as applying to "every Judge or commissioner,"

and thus drew no distinction between judicial discretion and administrative discretion. 77 Eng.
Rep. at 1138. See also S. DESMITH, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 247-49 (3d ed.
1973).
33. Prohibitions Del Roy, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342, 1343 (1608).

34. See C.

FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

77-83 (2d ed.

1963); Corwin, The "HigherLaw" Backgroundof American ConstitutionalLaw, 42 HARv. L.
REV. 365, 368 (1929) [hereinafter cited as Corwin].
35. BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 27, at 56. Coke's belief in the supremacy
of judicially-declared common law over the legislature did not make the courts the overseers of
Parliament. He conceived the ultimate law-declaring body to be Parliament, but in its judicial
rather than legislative incarnation, as the "High Court of Parliament." See generally MacKay,
Coke-ParliamentarySovereignty or the Supremacy ofthe Law?, 22 MICH. L. REV. 215 (1924).

36. Corwin, supra note 34, at 366, 379-80, 394-404.
37. 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 437-41 (1927) [hereinafter cited as
HOLDSWORTH].
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a higher law which would check the crown equally with Lords and Commons. Once the supremacy of Parliament was established, the notion of a
law beyond all mortal institutions was no longer an ally of parliamentarianism. At home, higher law became the province of ecclesiastics rather than
courts; abroad, it became an inspiration for revolution.
Two centuries after Coke, John Austin expounded what was to become
the dominant nineteenth-century, Anglo-American view of law. Inspired by
his contemporary, Jeremy Bentham, Austin advocated abandonment of the
uneasy and unenforced deference to higher law displayed by existing juris39
prudence 38 in favor of the empirical concept of "positive" law.
Austin's concept of law was premised upon distinguishing legal rules
from other forms of obligation. Such rules were "positive" because they
were unalloyed by any higher law of God or nature, and were a function
solely of the relative "position" of persons as political superiors or inferiors. 4° Such rules constituted "laws (properly so called)," as opposed to
"morality," because they were not "merely opinions or sentiments held or
felt by men in regard to human conduct" but were rather the "direct or
circuitous command of a monarch or sovereign number in the character of
political superior.'"41 In a simple, autocratic society, legal rules would flow
directly from a single sovereign personality; in more complex societies, the
sovereign power would be more diffused, by virtue of either the number of
agents required to do the sovereign's bidding, or the institutionilization of
sovereignty itself. 42 Whatever their source, it was crucial to Austin that rules
were commands, issued in expectation of compliance and enforced by "the
power and the purpose of inflicting eventual evil." 43 Austin's positive law
was meant not to guide, but to govern.
Austin himself had no difficulty in acknowledging the existence of
gaps in his legal system of sovereign commands and according judges a
practical discretion to fill those gaps by their decisions in hard cases. 44
Judges were as worthy agents of the sovereign as any other ministers of
state, and the rules of decision in hard cases acquired legal force as
38. See W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 134 (5th ed. 1967); BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 27, at 56-57. Compare 1W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
ENGLAND 41 (1771) with BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 27, at 161.
39. See J.AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (H.L.A. Hart ed. 1965)
[hereinafter cited as AUSTIN]. On Bentham's influence, see id. at vii-viii, xvi-xvii; Hart, Law in
Perspective, supra note 8, at 540; DWORKIN, supra note 3, at vii.
40. AUSTIN, supra note 39, at 11; see id. at 253-54.
41. Id. at 12, 123.
42. See id. at 216-29.
43. Id. at 17 (emphasis omitted).
44. See id.at 31, 191.
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sovereign commands insofar as the state acquiesced in their enforcement. 45
As it became popularized in Anglo-American law in the latter half of the
nineteenth century, however, the appeal of Austinian positivism lay not in
its legitimation of judicial lawmaking but in its affirmation of the separation
of law and morals. The empirical cast of positivism and its celebration of the
sovereignty of the legislatures of the English-speaking democracies, unfettered from any traces of natural law, gave rise to an era of "mechanical
jurisprudence. "I A general belief in the pervasiveness of the positive law
cast judges in the role of logicians rather than lawmakers, their decisions
derived deductively from existing law, rather than contributing inductively
to emerging law.
The tendency- was to deny the existence of gaps in the legal system at
almost any cost to judicial candor. When hard cases arose, the rationalizations constructed to resolve them seemed dedicated principally to demonstrating why they were not really hard cases at all. Rules which fell short of
covering the dispute at hand were by official fiat stretched over the apparent
gap. Since the terms of the process did not admit that gap-filling was going
on, the covering opinions did not reveal why one rule was stretched in
preference to another, and the courts were perceived as unresponsive to
arguments based on the reasonableness of desired results rather than the
reasoning, however sterile, that would best preserve the semblance of a
seamless legal web.4 7
45. "The rules which [a judge] makes derive their legal force from authority given by. the
state: an authority which the state may confer expressly, but which it commonly imparts in the
way of acquiescence. For, since the state may reverse the rules which he makes, and yet
permits him to enforce them by the power of the political community, its sovereign will 'that his
rules shall obtain as law' is clearly evinced by its conduct, though not by its express declaration." Id. at 31-32. Austin saw judicial lawmaking as the medium for transforming custom and
morality into law, using custom and morality as the grounds of judicial decisions upon cases.
Id. at 163. Although Austin did not deem judges to be confined to utilizing only custom or
morality in deciding hard cases, he would probably have argued that the greater the departure
by a judge from some conventional sense of appropriate conduct, the greater the chance that
the sovereign will refuse to acquiesce in the decision-especially where the sovereign is a
popularly elected legislature. See id. at 31, 191-92. See also BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE,
supra note 27, at 347.
46. See Pound, MechanicalJurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REv. 605 (1908).
47. See generally J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW § 224 (1909); POUND,
supra note 25, at 142 & n.40. Both Hart and Dworkin have suggested that a bygone era of
mechanical jurisprudence is more myth than history, at least in Anglo-American law. See Hart,
Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 608-11 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as Hart, Positivism]; DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 15-16. Cf. BODENHEIMER,
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 27, at 115-16 (gaplessness of turn-of-the-century German legal
positivism). The principal importance of the notion of mechanical jurisprudence may be as a
conceptual foil which focuses attention on the discretionary aspects of modern judicial decisionmaking, in the sense that however their decisions may now be analyzed, nineteenthcentury judges and jurists did not commonly acknowledge the role of judicial discretion.
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Thus it was that when a more sociological jurisprudence emerged to
offer manifold reasons for the ways in which judges manipulated rules in
hard cases, respectable elements of the American legal community erupted
from years of repression to display an almost prurient fascination with the
"real" reasons, abstract reasoning aside, behind judicial decisionmaking.
Indeed, during the earlier years of this century it appeared from the writings
of some of the foremost American legal intellectuals as if, like the smile of
48
the Cheshire cat, there was nothing left of the positive law but its gaps.
Where once there had been only easy cases, governed ineluctably by
positive rules, now every case could be treated as a hard case. Habit and the
hierarchy of appellate courts placed practical limits on judicial innovation,
but in theory the law had become a medium for the expression of the
prejudices and principles of the first passing judge.
Whatever the excesses of the legal realists' reaction to the disingenuous
adjudication which had occurred under color of gapless positivism, jurisprudential thought in general approached a new consensus. As courts molded
law to meet the exigencies of depression and war, it became increasingly
difficult to dispute the basic tenets of sociological jurisprudence. Nonetheless, I would contend that the predominant tenor of judicial opinions has
remained at least nominally deferential to established legal doctrine.
The formal reconciliation of classical positivism and more sociological
views of jurisprudence has taken place at the hands of Professor Hart. For
the past two decades he has offered an appealing restatement of positivism
which includes three elements relevant here. 49 First, Hart uses the term
"rule" in a refined sense which emphasizes the role of social obligation
rather than sovereign coercion in inducing compliance. 50 Second, Hart
attempts to construct a master test, his so-called "rule of recognition," for
Certainly the realization that such discretion could not easily be disclaimed has profoundly
influenced the tenor of modem jurisprudential debate. See id. at 347; Bodenheimer, supra

note 8, at 1145-49. See also J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 55-57, 147, 282 (1949). Both the
role-as-foil and the influence of mechanical jurisprudence are evident in these lines from
Holmes' famous opening paragraph in The Common Law, first published in 1881: "The lifeof
the law has not been logic; it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent

moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the
prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the
syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed. The law embodies the

story of a nation's development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it
contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics." O.W. HOLMES, THE
COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
48. See, e.g., K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 13 (1930); J. FRANK, LAW AND THE
MODERN MIND 50 (1963 ed).
49. See HART, supra note 14. See also Hart, Positivism, supra note 47; Hart, Law in
Perspective, supra note 8.
50. See HART, supra note 14, at 79-84.
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determining which rules are legal rules.5 1 Third, Hart acknowledges far
more openly than
Austin the judicial discretion 52 necessary to deal with the
"open texture" 53 of law in a world concededly unfit "for 'mechanical'
54
jurisprudence."
B. The Hart/Dworkin Dispute
The most serious challenge to Hart's articulation of the modern, AngloAmerican concept of law has come from Professor Dworkin. Dworkin
applauds Hart as a moral philosopher for having demonstrated the important
role of moral obligation in the concept of law. 55 Dworkin argues, however,
that Hart's emphasis on "rules" fails to take adequate account of less formal
sources of law, in the sense that the fundamental tenets of a given legal
system's institutional and political morality are a part of its law and are no6
5
less binding on its judges than the formal "rules" recognized by Hart.
Although it has ramifications throughout Hart's work, Dworkin's criticism
is focused most acutely on Hart's acquiescence in judicial discretion to
"make" law in hard cases.
In addition to referring to the "open texture" of the law, Hart uses the
metaphor of "the problems of the penumbra" in describing judicial discretion.5 7 Surrounding the "hard core" of any legal rule is "a penumbra of
uncertainty." 5 8 Within this penumbral area the application of legal rules to
specific cases "cannot be a matter of logical deduction." 5 9 Hart concedes
that "if legal arguments and legal decisions of penumbral questions are to be
rational, their rationality must lie in something other than a logical relation
to premises,'" 6 and even accuses Bentham and Austin of having failed to
understand "that the criterion which makes a decision sound in such cases is
some concept of what the law ought to be." 6 1 Where Hart and Dworkin
disagree is whether, if a judge must indeed make "a moral judgment about
what the law ought to be" 62 in order to decide a hard case, the content of
that moral judgment is a matter of personal judicial choice, left to the
discretion of the judge in the "strong" sense previously discussed, 63 or is
51. See id. at 91-107.
52. See id. at 132, 135, 138-43.

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See id. at 124.
Id. at 125.
DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 7, 19-20.
See id. at 14-80.
Hart, Positivism, supra note 47, at 607.
Id.; see also HART, supra note 14, at 12.
Hart, Positivism, supra note 47, at 607.
Id. at 608.
Id.
Id.
See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
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part of the pre-existing law which the judge is bound to apply, leaving the
judge with only the "weak" discretion to fit the governing law to the facts
of the case. Hart insists that judges have real choices to make in such
situations. In revising positivism to take greater account of the generative
role of the judiciary, he refuses to assert that judges in the shadows are
bound to navigate a predetermined path through uncharted realms of law by
reference to beacons of morality not yet reduced to rule. When confronting
hard cases, Hart believes, "here if anywhere we live among uncertainties
between which we have to choose, and. . . the existing law imposes only
limits on our choice and not the choice itself."64
Dworkin contends that judicial discretion in hard cases is circumscribed by a panoply of legally binding imperatives other than the legal
"rules" of the positive law. Hart's "rule of recognition" for distinguishing
rules of law from moral or otherwise extra-legal grounds for decision is
therefore denounced as too limiting. 65 Besides Hart's rules, to which Dworkin attributes an "all-or-nothing" effect which precludes more than one
valid rule from applying to a given set of facts, 66 Dworkin claims that the
law consists of "principles" which incline but do not control judicial
decisions in hard cases. 67 Despite their inability to dispose of cases, such
principles are binding on a judge in the sense that their collective weight,
properly measured, determines the one legally correct answer to a hard
68
case.
64. Hart, Positivism, supra note 47, at 629.
65. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 22-45.
66. Id. at 24. See also id. at 27. See note 72 infra.
67. See DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 35.
68. See id. at 44. A factor in Dworkin's development of a concept of law as existing
independently of the minds of judges may be the coexistence of his belief in a moral obligation
to follow the law, see note 55 and accompanying text supra, and his support of resistance to the
draft by conscientious objectors to the Vietnam War. At one time Dworkin advocated a
position of tolerance, arguing for lenient treatment of resisters on the basis of the generative
role played by acts of dissent in the development and testing of the law through experimentation
by citizens and through the adversary process, and dismissing as nonsensical the notion that
there is always a right answer to a legal problem to be found in natural law; thus he seemingly
disclaimed "treating law as a 'brooding omnipresence in the sky.'" Id. at 215-17 (originally
published as Dworkin, On Not ProsecutingCivil Disobedience, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS 14, 18-19
(June 6, 1968)).
His later writings, such as chapters four and thirteen of Taking Rights Seriously, see
DWORKIN, supra note 3, rely more heavily on the idea that there is indeed a single right answer
to every case, even though no means exist to determine conclusively what that answer is. Hart
has accordingly hung the "brooding omnipresence" label on Dworkin. See Hart, Law in
Perspective, supra note 8, at 546-47. The philosophical premise of the single right answer allows
for the possibility, indeed the inevitability, that judges will make unjust mistakes in adjudicating
disputes about legal rights. Thus, it is arguable that those whose rights suffer from such
mistakes are justified in acts of dissent, since noncompliance with the judgment of a court does
not necessarily entail noncompliance with the moral obligation to abide by the law. See
DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 212-14.
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Hart would afford a greater scope to judicial discretion the farther the
facts take the judge from the core of settled meaning of a legal rule;
Dworkin inverts the image to confine discretion to the "hole in a doughnut,
. . .an area left open by a surrounding belt of restriction.'"69 Dworkin thus
insists that judicial discretion properly consists solely of the "weak" variety
necessary to resolve ambiguity in the proper application of legal standards
which are acknowledged to be binding.7 0 Indeed, he characterizes such
discretion as "trivial," 71 and seemingly believes that an ideal judge will
have so astutely ascertained and assayed the relevant legal standards that,
outside of whatever fact-finding responsibilities the judge may have, 72 no
judicial discretion will remain to be exercised.
A more apt image for Dworkin's purposes would seem to be not the
hole of a doughnut, but the sensitivity of the eye of a judge. The better the
judicial eye for the law-the more enlightenment the judge can derive from
surveying all possible sources of law in search of the single right answer to a
hard case-then the more confined will be the scope of discretion open to
69. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 31.
70. E.g., id. at 31-38, 68-71.
71. Id. at 38, 44.
72. For a discussion of the problems presented by fact finding discretion, see note 16
supra.
Dworkin's illustrations of the distinction between strong and weak discretion refer principally to two situations: a sergeant charged with picking the soldiers to take on patrol, and a
boxing referee. If the sergeant is ordered to select any five men for his patrol, Dworkin says he
has discretion in the strong sense. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 32. Assuming more than five men
are available to him, his choice from among them is unrestricted. By contrast, if the sergeant is
ordered to take his five most experienced men, his choice must be justified in terms of
"experience." Id. It may require "judgment" to determine who is experienced, but this is
discretion in the weak sense. Id. at 34. Similarly, the boxing referee charged with awarding the
match to the more aggressive boxer has weak discretion. Id. at 32. Both experience and
aggression are not clear-cut determinants-both demand the exercise of judgment-but they
are nonetheless standards to which the sergeant and the referee must conform.
Dworkin seems strangely ambivalent about the character of the stunted "judgment" which
the sergeant and the referee, as paradigms for judges, do exercise: on the one hand it is
"trivial," jurisprudentially "otiose," a "tautology" mistaken by positivists as "insight." Id. at
33, 34, 38. On the other hand, it takes "a lawyer of superhuman skill, learning, patience and
acumen" to give due effect to the process of "judgment." Id. at 105; see text accompanying
notes 100-13 infra. While the scope of Dworkin's weak discretion is relatively trivial, the chore
of avoiding abuse of such discretion is an exacting one. In the context of his example, the
sergeant may not choose a meaning for "experience"; he must deduce it from the overall
context of the military enterprise of which he is a part. However difficult this may be, he knows
it is his duty. This is not zealotry on his part; he is simply aware that if obedience of his orders is
questioned, he must have at hand his theory of decision and be able to show that he acted
consistently with it, without having arrogated to himself an authority not delegated to him. Thus
he devotes his best judgment to determining that his superior meant for him to select, for
example, those men with the most hours on patrol during the monsoon season, and knows he
has no choice but to apply that standard. His only choice lies in resolving whatever dispute may
arise as to which of his men has had the most such experience. See id. at 31-32.
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the judge. Were that judge to perceive perfectly the institutional history and
political morality of the legal system, all discretion would be eliminated
from the envisioned decision. Since by Dworkin's lights judges do not
possess discretion to make law, Hart's "open texture" of the law must
consist not of gaps but of blind spots.
Dworkin's problem, of course, is how judges should grope through
blind spots in search of his single right answer. The law may be without
gaps in theory, but there will remain hard cases-truly hard cases 7 ---in
which, no matter how extensive a reference is made to nonformal sources of
law, to standards or norms other than what a positivist would call rules, able
lawyers may reasonably differ as to the legally right result. Mere knowledge
that somewhere in the unfocussed wilderness Dworkinian dogma posits
sound ground surrounded on all sides by error will increase the anxiety but
not the mental acuity of a sightless searcher for truth and virtue. Dworkin's
assurances that a superhuman judge can always divine the one right answer
to a hard case offer no comfort to a mortal judge nagged by doubt as to the
correct course of decision. Dworkin does not leave doubtful judges without
a strategy for salvation, however. Under the rubric of his "rights thesis," he
dictates that doubts in hard cases should be resolved in74favor of recognizing
individual rights rather than effecutating social goals.
Dworkin's rights thesis is premised upon a taxonomy of obligation. At
the highest level there is the legal order, and presumably one or more nonlegal orders of obligation (moral, religious, political, etc.). Within the legal
order there are the two genera of rules and principles.75 Positivists, says
73. As previously suggested, see notes 4 & 15 and accompanying text supra, the gist of
Dworkin's argument would seem to be that the harder Herculean lawyers labor on a case, the

less difficult it will become. As successively more successful theories of justification for a
particular result in a hard case are advanced, resort to at least some of the initially attractive

alternatives proposed by reasonable adversaries will be revealed as defective, and can be
defended further only by resort to irrational claims. By definition, however, irrational arguments do not figure in the hard case calculus. See text accompanying note 5 supra. According-

ly, after Herculean labors have cleansed the courtroom as well as the Augean stables,
further rational dispute over the right result can only be based on the Hercules' heel of
Dworkin's rights thesis: the different conceptions of contested political concepts and institutional morality which Dworkin concedes will leave the most dedicated of rights-conscious
judges divided as to the proper resolution of a hard case. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 127-28; see
notes 87-90 and accompanying text infra. At this point philosophical arguments about smoothly
fitting theories, see DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 106, lose force because the disputants no longer

agree on what it is that their theories must fit. "Thus the 'hard case' for Dworkin is what might
be called the 'really hard case': the decision that must be reached on the basis of standards that,

by definition, lead to results inherently unconventional, inherently controversial, and inherently incapable of producing 'interpersonal checks' as respects the substantive correctness of

the result." Soper, supra note 7, at 488 (footnote omitted).
74. See DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 81-150.
75. Id. at 22.
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Dworkin, confine their taxonomy to rules; his genus of principles embraces
the other, nonformal sources of law which he insists determine, collectively,
the right results in hard cases. Within the generic class of principles,
moreover, Dworkin identifies a species of policies as distinct from a species
of principles. A policy "advances or protects some collective goal of the
community as a whole." 76 A principle, in the specific sense, "respects or
secures some individual or group right. ",77
76. Id. at 82. Dworkin offers as an example: "The argument in favor of a subsidy for
aircraft manufacturers, that the subsidy will protect national defense, is an argument of
policy." Id. Dworkin adds that legislative acts effectuating policies give rise to rights supported
by principle. Thus the suit of an aircraft manufacturer to recover a statutory subsidy enacted on
policy grounds will be decided by a court on the basis of principle. Id. at 83.
77. Id. at 82. Originally, Dworkin defined a "policy" as "that kind of standard that sets
out a goal to be reached, generally an improvement in some economic, political, or social
feature of the community" and a "principle" as "a standard that is to be observed, not because
it will advance or secure an economic, political, or social situation deemed desirable, but
because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimension of morality." Id. at
22. He later elaborated that distinction so that "arguments of policy" were said to "justify a
political decision by showing that the decision advances or protects some collective goal of the
community as a whole," whereas "arguments of principle" were said to "justify a political
decision by showing that the decision respects or secures some individual or group right." Id. at
82. For Dworkin, both unoriginal decisions merely enforcing statutory language and decisions
in hard cases may only be supported by arguments of principle. Id. at 83-84. Dworkin claims
that his restatement of the principle/policy distinction is an improvement upon his earlier
"Model of Rules" formulation, see id. at 46-80, in that it avoids the collapse undergone by the
earlier formulation of the principle/policy distinction whenever a right is redefined as a social
goal or vice versa. An example of the problem is whether there is any difference of substance
between a decision premised on an argument of policy, such as a perceived collective social
goal of universal adult suffrage, and an identical decision premised on an argument of principle,
such as a perceived individual right of each adult to vote. As I understand Dworkin, he relies on
the lack of distributional consistency, which his doctrine of political responsibility permits for
decisions based on policy rather than principle, to support his distinction in the revised form
elaborated in his discussion of hard cases. See generally id. at 81-130.
Suppose a dam built and maintained by the government bursts, flooding a community and
causing extensive damage. The injured parties claim compensation is owed them by the
government. Had a private party operated the dam for profit, it would have been strictly liable
to the injured parties. The government had derived substantial revenues from the sale of
hydroelectric power generated by the dam, and a hard case is presented as to whether the
government is protected from liability by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Dworkin would
say it is the province of the legislature, but not the judiciary, to award compensation to the
victims of the flood as a matter of public policy, stemming the tide of bitterness which followed
the flood, and showing the concern of the government for those harmed by its actions. Such
policy-based compensation would not, according to Dworkin, commit the government to
provide similar compensation should another government dam burst. If the legislature does not
so act, Dworkin would permit a court to award the victims compensation, but only if the court
were to find, as a matter of principle, that the government was not entitled to invoke sovereign
immunity to frustrate the civil claims the injured parties would otherwise have. Such a holding,
being a recognition of a right rather than an attempt to further the collective goal of good feeling
toward the government by the citizenry, would establish the right of others to similar compensation should they be injured in the future in like fashion.
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Dworkin's argument is. that "judicial decisions in civil cases, even in
hard cases. . , characteristically are and should be generated by principle
not policy." 78 The normative aspect of his rights thesis is supported by two
arguments. Ideals of democracy, says Dworkin, demand that the making of
policy, "a compromise among individual goals and purposes in search of
the welfare of the community as a whole," is a matter for the political
processes of representative democracy rather than "nonelected judges, who
have no mail bag or lobbyists or pressure groups, to compromise competing
interests in their chambers." 79 Moreover, claims Dworkin, ideals of justice
demand that law be created prospectively; if judges decide cases by referring to policy arguments about the ends of social welfare, rather than to
arguments of principle about pre-existing individual rights, their decisions
80
will operate ex post facto and hence unfairly.
The descriptive aspect of the rights thesis depends upon what Dworkin
styles "the doctrine of political responsibility" 8 1 and its constituent demand
for "articulate consistency.' '82 Judges are political officials and their judgments are, in a broad sense, political decisions. If they are to act responsibly, they must "make only such political decisions as they can justify
within a political theory that also justifies the other decisions they propose to
make.''83 Policy decisions demand much less consistency than decisions of
principle, however, since
Dworkin admits that some judicial decisions appear to be based on policy rather than
principle, as when a court discusses negligence theory in terms of the economic cost of
accidents and their avoidance. Id. at 98-100. He contends that such cases are nevertheless
grounded in principle rather than policy, because what seem to be arguments of policy are
actually arguments about competing rights: they concern the claims of the parties against each
other, as articulated in an abstract sense of how the parties should best act to enhance their
mutual welfare. Such arguments do not interpolate "the costs or benefits to the community at
large" in some calculus of general utility. rd. at 98-99.
The ease with which policy may thus be transmogrified into principle has left some
commentators unimpressed with the principle/policy distinction, even as reformulated. See
Bodenheimer, supra note 8, at 1161-62; Rights Thesis, supra note 8, at 1176. Dworkin would
probably respond to these critics by emphasizing his doctrine of distributional consistency. If a
putatively policy-based judicial decision is nonetheless treated by the judiciary as governing
like cases without a fresh redetermination of policy in each such case, that proves that the
underlying decision was really based on principle and articulated a right to which those similarly
situated are equally entitled. For a discussion of the problems posed by using distributional
consistency as a test for whether a decision was generated by principle or policy, see notes 12939 and accompanying text infra.
78. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 84. On the import of the "civil cases" limitation, see notes
100-42 and accompanying text infra.
79. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 85.
80. See id. at 85-86.
81. Id. at 87.
82. Id. at 88.
83. Id. at 87.
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[p]olicies are aggregative in their influence on political decisions
and it need not be part of a responsible strategy for reaching a
collective goal that individuals be treated alike. . . . In the case of
principles, however, the doctrine insists on distributional consistency from one case to the next, because it does not allow for the
idea of a strategy that may84be better served by unequal distribution
of the benefit in question.
The rights thesis, Dworkin contends, accounts "for the special concern that
judges show for both precedents and hypothetical examples," a concern
unnecessary if judges are relying on policy rather than principle for their
85
decisions.
Under the rights thesis, "institutional history acts not as a constraint on
the political judgment of judges but as an ingredient of that judgment,
because institutional history is part of the background that any plausible
judgment about rights of an individual must accommodate. Political rights
are creatures of both history and morality . ... "86 Thus the hard case
poses a question of political theory.8 7 When the rules run out, says Dworkin,
judges must look "to the enterprise as a whole," 88 developing the theory
which best justifies the fabric of the legal system "by referring alternately to
political philosophy and institutional detail,"- 89 and then "applying that
9
general political theory to controversial issues about legal rights.'"'
Dworkin illustrates his rights thesis by reference to two hypothetical
judges, Hercules of Dworkin's camp, 91 and Herbert, an obvious disciple of
84. Id. at 88.

85. Id.
86. Id. at 87; should these words evoke in the reader a sense of d6ja vu, see notes 31-35
and accompanying text supra. That Coke was a disbeliever in natural law of the continental
mold and acknowledged instead a common law of shared tradition only enhances the degree to
which Professor Dworkin seemingly offers not a choice but an echo.
In his introduction to Taking Rights Seriously, Dworkin characterizes his theory of law as
embracing the idea of natural rights in the sense that "individuals can have rights against the
state that are prior to the rights created by explicit legislation." DWORKIN, supra note 3, at xi.
Nonetheless, Dworkin is sensitive to having his theory taken as relying on higher law, and
asserts that his theory "does not indicate what rights people have or guarantee, indeed, that
they have any." Id. Individual rights are "political trumps" held by individuals, and as

such lack any special metaphysical character; they are rather a function of "the dominant idea
of utilitarianism, which is the idea of a collective goal of the community as a whole ...
Individuals have rights when, for some reason, a collective goal is not a sufficient justification
for denying them what they wish, as individuals, to have or to do, or not a sufficient justification for imposing some loss or injury upon them." Id. As a practical matter, there may be
considerable doubt whether certain rights exist or not in a Dworkinian jurisdiction. See note 6
and accompanying text supra. Coke's system of supra-legal values had the advantage that Coke
himself was apparently ever-willing to tell the world just what the law was. See HOLDSw6RTH,
supra note 37, at 441.
87. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 104.
88. Id. at 105.
89. Id. at 107.
90. See id. at 105-07.
91. See id. at 105-30.
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his namesake Hart. 92 Herbert decides whether either party has a right to a
favorable decision by rule of law, and if not, proceeds to exercise "a
legislative discretion" informed by history and morality but not controlled
by it. 93 Hercules is never faced by a party without a right to a favorable
decision, although even he may be sorely taxed by the ratiocination needed
to derive the theory of decision which will identify which party has right on
its side-a theory to be spun from institutional history and political morality. 9 4 "The law may not be a seamless web; but the plaintiff is entitled to ask
Hercules to treat it as if it were." 95 More human judges may, as actors in the
very institution whose history and morality they must measure, "reason
intuitively and introspectively rather than in the more sociological mode that
an outsider might use.''96 But if they follow Hercules' path, they will be
conscious that they are not conferring rights but are determining what rights
already exist. Thus their personal convictions of what rights should exist are
relevant only as guides to institutional mores.
At the foundation of the rights thesis, however, is not morality but
history; it is built upon a phenomenon to which Hart admits having paid
inadequate heed: the "gravitational force" which an "earlier decision
exerts . . . on later decisions even when these later decisions lie outside its
particular orbit." ' 97 Unlike a legislator, whose votes must be personally
consistent but need not follow the votes of colleagues or predecessors, "the
judge very rarely assumes that character of independence. He will always
try to connect the justification he provides for an original decision with
decisions that other judges or officials have taken in the past."98 Ironically,
if Hercules succeeds Herbert on the bench he will find himself bound by
Dworkin to follow in Hart's footsteps, for Herbert's ostensibly discretionary
paths in the law, unless clearly misguided, 99 will point in the direction of the
right answers to Hercules' hard cases.
92. See id. at 125-29.
93. Id. at 125.
94. See id. at 107.
95. Id.at 116.

96. Id. at 128.
97. Hart has applauded Dworkin's phrase "gravitational force," declaring it "right and
illuminating to speak of the existing law as exerting a gravitational pull over the judge ....Hart, Law in Perspective, supra note 8, at 549-50. He betrays his skepticism, however, by
suggesting that there will often be equal gravitational pulls in different directions. Id. at 550.

Dworkin has since acknowledged this possibility, but discounted it as being so remote that it
should, in practice, be ignored. See note 4 supra.
98. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 112.
99. Part of Hercules' problem in reviewing all the past hands of the law in search of
trumps, see note 86 supra, is the need to reshiffle the misdeals of other judges. "If the history
of his court is at all complex, he will find, in practice, that the requirement of total consistency
he has accepted will prove too strong, unless he develops it further to include the idea that he
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The Relevance of People v. Coleman to the Dispute

One matter remains before turning to the Coleman case. How can a
case of criminal procedure have any bearing on the dispute between Hart
and Dworkin, given that Dworkin purports in places to limit the applicability of his rights thesis in other than "common law" civil cases?1 °° If
Dworkin truly insists that his work applies only to civil cases posing hard
questions about the applicability of precedent, his thesis is in jeopardy of
becoming anachronistic. The dominant sources of law in the twentieth
century are the legislatures, not the courts;' 0 ' this is what has made the
constitutional functions of courts so much more important than their "common law" functions. The "common law" domain of federal courts has
shrunk drastically over the last forty years, 102 and indeed in California there
is little substantive "common law" at all, save as a colloquialism. In light
of the comprehensive attempt to codify the law of California which dates
may, in applying this requirement, disregard some part of institutional history as a mistake."
DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 119. Dworkin thus includes within his rights thesis a provision for
discarding from the deck of precedent decisions based on outmoded or unjust principles. See
id. at 119-23.
100. See note 78 and accompanying text supra. Cf. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 94 n.l:
"Ordinary civil cases at law, which are the principal subject of this essay, involve rights against
fellow citizens; but I also discuss certain issues of constitutional and criminal law and so touch
on rights against the state as well"; id. at 115-16: Hercules "[s]ees that the familiar concept
used by judges to explain their reasoning from precedent, the concept of certain principles that
underlie or are embedded in the common law, is itself only a metaphorical statement of the
rights thesis. He may henceforth use that concept in his decisions of hard common law cases."
101. "Inevitably the work of the Supreme Court reflects the great shift in the center of
gravity of lawmaking . . . . [Als late as 1875 more than 40% of the controversies before the
Court were common-law litigation, fifty years later only 5%, while today cases not resting on
statutes are reduced almost to zero. It is therefore accurate to say that courts have ceased to be
the primary makers of law in the sense that they 'legislated' the common law. It is certainly true
of the Supreme Court that almost every case has a statute at its heart or close to it."
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 527 (1947).
102. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). As teachers of federal jurisdiction
never tire of pointing out, Justice Brandeis performed one of the great straddling acts of legal
history by authoring both the opinion for the Court in Erie in which he declared resoundingly
"there is no federal general common law," id. at 78, and the opinion in Hinderlider v. La Plata
River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938), decided the same day as Erie, wherein he
declared that "[w]hether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned between the two
States is a question of 'federal common law.' "304 U.S. at 110. Federal common law continues
to be applied not only to interstate water cases, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91
(1972), but also to cases in which federal interests are deemed to require a uniform federal rule
of decision rather than the ad hoc application of the laws of the several states. See, e.g., Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (effect to be given to an expropriation order
of a foreign nation); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947) (right of the
government to recover losses resulting from injury to a soldier); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (law applicable to the issuance of a federal government check).
Similarly, much of the law of admiralty remains judicially declared. See, e.g., Moragne v.
States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970); Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205
(1917).
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from the very beginning of California's statehood, judicial decisions in
California generally assume the form of interpretations of often very vague
statutes, 10 3 except in constitutional cases or where the Supreme Court of
California has asserted inherent judicial power to regulate adjudicatory
procedure.'°4
Another response to Dworkin's possible limitations is that he is himself
inconsistent in his explication of his concept of law and the generality of its
scope. Prior to stating that the rights thesis is directed to civil cases' 0 5 and
suggesting its further limitation to cases at common law, 6 he offers as
illustrations of the application of his thesis a case of constitutional interpretation pitting a child's purported statutory right to a free ride to parochial
school against the Establishment Clause;10 7 and a case of statutory interpretation concerning the applicability of the federal kidnapping act to an elderly
polygamist who induces a mentally retarded minor to escape the clutches of
a juvenile court and marry him in Mexico. 10 8 These examples certainly
argue against any intention by Dworkin to exclude constitutional cases,
criminal cases or cases arising under statutes from the purview of his rights
thesis.
Nor does Dworkin show any consistent determination to exclude from
his thesis cases raising questions of procedural rather than substantive
rights. It is useful here to note in full Dworkin's two slender elaborations
upon the purported limitations to his rights thesis. First, in arguing that there
exists no rule of decision in the Anglo-American legal system giving judges
the power to decide hard cases by the exercise of "strong" discretion, he
goes on:
Sometimes judges do reach that conclusion; for example, when
passing sentences under criminal statutes that provide a maximum
and minimum penalty, or when framing equitable relief under a
general equity jurisdiction. In such cases judges believe that no one
has any right to a particular decision; they identify their task as
selecting the decision that is best on the whole, all things considered, and here they talk not about what they must do but about
what they should do. In most hard cases, however, judges take the
different posture I described.1 9
Thus, Dworkin explicitly concedes that the behavior of at least some
judges, with regard to criminal sentencing and "general equity" cases, does
103. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 813-23, 532 P.2d 1226, 1232-39, 119
Cal. Rptr. 858, 864-71 (1975).
104. See, e.g., People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 442, 282 P.2d 905, 910 (1955).
105. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 84. See note 100 supra.
106. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 115-16. See note 100 supra.
107. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 106-07 (citing Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1

(1947)).
108. rd. at 107-09 (citing Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455 (1946)).
109. Id. at 71.
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not conform to his thesis that "judges decide hard cases by confirming or
denying concrete rights."1! 0 He does not make a similar concession regarding criminal (and presumably civil) procedure. 1 ' He does observe, as if in
anticipation of the Coleman case, that "appeals to public safety or the
scarcity of some vital resource," although they might appear to be arguments of policy upon which courts, under the rights thesis, are not supposed
to rely, are better understood as arguments of principle based on "abstract
rights.''112 He proceeds immediately from this assertion to the following
paragraph:
This is an appropriate point to notice a certain limitation of the
rights thesis. It holds in standard civil cases, when the ruling
assumption is that one of the parties has a right to win; but it holds
only asymmetrically when that assumption cannot be made. The
accused in a criminal case has a right to a decision in his favor if he
is innocent, but the state has no parallel right to a conviction if he is
guilty. The court may therefore find in favor of the accused, in
some hard case testing rules of evidence, for example, on an
argument of policy that does not suppose that the accused has any
right to be acquitted. The Supreme Court in Linkletter v. Walker
[381 U.S. 618 (1965)] said that its earlier decision in Mapp v. Ohio
[367 U.S. 643 (1961)] was such a decision. The Court said it had
changed the rules permitting the introduction of illegally obtained
evidence, not because Miss Mapp had any right that such evidence
not be used if otherwise admissible, but in order to deter policemen
from collecting such evidence in the future. I do not mean that a
constitutional decision on such grounds is proper, or even that the
Court's later description of its earlier decision was accurate. I
mean only to point out how the geometry of a criminal prosection
[sic], which does not set opposing rights in a case against one
another, differs from the standard civil case in which the rights
thesis holds symmetrically." 3
I find this paragraph in part incomprehensible. To the extent that to be
"innocent" means only that the conduct of the accused is not a crime, as a
matter of statutory interpretation, or cannot be made a crime, as a matter of
constitutional right, the accused clearly has a right to be acquitted, and by
his illustrative references to an Establishment Clause case and the case of the
pedophilic polygamist, Dworkin has asserted that claims of innocence on
such grounds are supposed to be handled in accordance with his rights
thesis. More troublesome is the suggestion that an accused's right to acquit110. Id. at 101.
111. See id. at xii (where in his introduction Dworkin states that he will apply his rights
thesis "to the central and politically important cases of constitutional adjudication"); id. at 279
(where he begins his concluding chapter by insisting that "whether capital punishment is cruel
and unusual within the meaning of the constitution" must be resolved in accordance with the
rights thesis).
112. See id. at 100.
113. Id. The word "prosection" in the final sentence appeared as "prosecution" in the
original article. Hard Cases, supra note. 3, at 1078.

Fall 19771

JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND JURISPRUDENCE

tal turns on some supposition of factual innocence vel non. Surely anyone
who has pondered the vagaries of judicial fact-finding would be shocked to
have one's "rights" in a criminal trial, assuming the offense charged to be
substantively valid, limited to the "right" to acquittal if as a matter of
abstract fact one has not done what it is alleged one has done. Even when
facts are contemporaneously subject to objective observation, efforts at their
subsequent construction carry no better warranty for truth than Dworkin's
single right answer to issues of law. To the accused, the facts are not a
philosophical conundrum but what the finder of fact says they are, and the
rights of the accused are not contingent upon but supposedly contributory to
the accuracy of that fact-finding, with the additional right that the accused
receives the benefit of any perceived doubt in the' accuracy of the fact
finding.
As Dworkin elsewhere recognizes, the procedural rights of one accused
of a criminal offense are classic examples of his definition of rights as
political trumps derived from moral principles, by which the interests of
individuals or minorities are protected against the majority's utilitarian
claims to measures productive of the greater good of the greater number. 114
For instance, he points to the "moral principles" underlying controversial
aspects of the criminal law, such as "rules of criminal procedure-regarding interrogation, confessions, and preventive detention, for example-that
protect the alleged criminal at some cost to police efficiency," and disavows
the propriety of a balancing process between the protection of individual
freedom and the prevention of crime. 115 There are, he suggests,
[llegal doctrines that are embedded in our traditions (like the doctrines that no man may be forced to condemn himself, and that a
man is presumed innocent until proved guilty) to support the claim
that society has no right to interrogate a man without a lawyer, and
to be free before his trial,
that an accused suspect is entitled 16
whether the majority benefits or not.
Thus Dworkin might be understood to be saying this in his limiting
paragraph: individuals accused of crime have certain rights regarding the
substance of what may be made criminal and the reliability and bias of
procedures for determining factual guilt or innocence. Even when all of
114. See DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 12-13, 143, 185, 203.
115. Id. at 12. A serious typographical error involving the transposition of several words
makes gibberish of the first sentence of the first full paragraph on page 12 of Taking Rights
Seriously, from which this quotation is taken. As the essay originally appeared, that paragraph
commences with the following two sentences: "The mental defenses are not the only controversial aspects of the criminal law. Just now the public is even more concerned with those rules
Qf criminal procedure-regarding interrogation, confessions, and preventive detention-that

protect the alleged criminal at some cost to police efficiency." Dworkin, Moralityand the Law,
N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS 29, 33 (May 22, 1969).
116. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 12-13.
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these rights are satisfied, however, and an individual has been found to have
committed an act validly punishable as a crime, the state has no "right" to a
conviction. Rights relate to the status of individuals and groups against
society; the state does what policy dictates, subject to its duty to honor
individual rights. Judges, as agents of the state, may act legislatively by
refusing to convict guilty individuals on policy grounds, such as the exclusionary rule's policy of deterring police from violations of the Fourth
(and Fourteenth) Amendment. Thus, in a criminal prosecution, the rights
thesis "holds only asymmetrically" because only the accused has rights
117
which are proof against judicial discretion.
There are several problems with Dworkin's position, even as reformulated. I do not propose to pursue them, only to identify them. First, it
would seemingly demand generalization beyond criminal prosecutions to
every civil proceeding to which some agent or instrumentality of the state is
a party. Is Dworkin really prepared to accept the exercise of legislative
discretion by judges in civil litigation as long as the rights of any private
parties are not prejudiced? In some such instances Dworkin might cast the
state as merely the proxy for non-parties whose "abstract rights" are
involved,' 18 as when a district attorney sues to have some nuisance abated
that poses harm to some portions of the community or (to abide by Dworkin's purported exclusion from the rights thesis of "general equity" cases) 1 9
seeks civil penalties for acts of consumer fraud. This would preserve a
"symmetrical" setting for his rights thesis. In many civil cases, however,
the government is clearly representing the interests of society as a whole.
Consider, for example, a condemnation case. Dworkin already seems to
assert, since individual rights are more important than governmental interests, that a court should be sure to give the claimant a little more rather than
120
a little less, in order to hold inviolate the right to just compensation.
Suppose, however, that the condemned land has been acquired for the
building of a freeway, construction of which has, at the time of the compensation judgment, been enjoined because of a lack of compliance with the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 12 1 Would Dworkin permit the
court, in order to effectuate a policy of deterring future violations of
NEPA, to award the condemnee an additional percentage of the value of the
117. See id. at 100.
118. See id. See note 112 and accompanying text supra.
119. But see notes 109-10 and accompanying text supra, for Dorkin's purported exclusion of "general equity" cases.
120. See id. at 197-205; Greenawalt, supra note 8, at 376 n.48. See also DWORKIN, supra
note 3, at 277-78.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 4331-4347 (Supp. V 1975). Cf. 1-291 Why? Assoc. v. Bums, 372 F. Supp.
223, 232-40 (D. Conn. 1974) (construction of freeway in violation of NEPA enjoined after
completion of land acquisition).
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land? If this would be inconsistent with the rights thesis, why is Mapp v.
Ohio' 22 not? Even more interesting, perhaps, is a civil case in which
governmental entities constitute both sides: 123 if one accepts Dworkin's
logic, it would seem that judicial discretion may run rampant on a field of
policy in the absence of an applicable statute.
A second problem is posed by Dworkin's acceptance of judicially
created, policy-oriented procedural rules only when they do not infringe on
the supposed right of an individual to the result dictated by the true facts and
the substantive law. This position fails to account for the use of judicially
created exclusionary rules in private civil cases, such as the rules of
privileged communications or the rule excluding evidence of subsequent
remedial measures. 124 If a person manipulates stock to an investor's detriment and the substantive law entitles the investor to damages from the
manipulator, it is difficult to find sanction in the rights thesis for denying the
investor his or her judgment because the only hard evidence of the true facts
is the confession that the manipulator made to his lawyer. Dworkin would
argue, presumably, that the privilege protects the competing abstract right to
consult a lawyer free of prejudice, but much of the judicial authority for an
attorney-client privilege appears to rely equally on both the benefit to the
courts of encouraging people to retain lawyers for their causes, and on the
benefit to individuals of having legal representation made more effective by
the confidences revealed under the cloak of the privilege. 125 Moreover, such
an argument would only underscore the contention that, if it is indeed such
"[a] simple matter to transform what appears to be an argument of policy
into an argument of principle. . . ,then nothing counts conceptually as an
126
argument of policy," and the rights thesis is "logically vacuous."'
Dworkin must confront at least one more problem if his limiting
paragraph on Mapp v. Ohio127 and Linkletter v. Walker1 28 is indeed to be
construed as I have suggested. The essence of his distinction between
policies and principles is the "distributional requirements" of the goals and
rights to which they respectively appeal. 129 Rights and the arguments of
122. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See note 139 infra.
123. See, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
124. The common law privileges regarding communications, and the history of the attor-

ney-client privilege in particular, are discussed in 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2285, 2290
(McNaughton rev. 1961). The common law origins of the exclusion of evidence of subsequent
repairs are collected in 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 283 (3d ed. 1940).
125. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291, cases collected at 546-47 (McNaughton rev.
1961).
126. Rights Thesis, supra note 8, at 1181 (emphasis omitted).
127. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See note 139 infra.
128. 381 U.S. 618 (1965). See note 139 infra.
129. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 88.
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principle which support them are "individuated": if any one person is
entitled to a right, all similarly situated persons are equally entitled to that
right. 130 Goals and the policies which advance them are "nonindividuated":
that one person may benefit from an effort at serving some collective social
31
goal confers no right to the same benefit on all similarly situated persons. 1
Thus a policy of national defense can permit subsidization of one arms
manufacturer without requiring the subsidization of all arms manufacturers,
but a right to privacy cannot entitle one couple to access to contraceptives
132
without entitling all such couples to equal access.
The distributional character of the exclusionary rule is clearly of con133
cern to Dworkin. He began his original article on The Model of Rules,
now chapter two of his book, 134 by citing to Linkletter as exposing our
"remarkably fragile" understanding of law.135
Supposing the Supreme Court orders some prisoner freed because
the police used procedures that the Court now says are constitutionally forbidden, although the Court's earlier decisions upheld
these procedures. "Must the Court, to be consistent, free all other
prisoners previously convicted through these same procedures? . . ." [Citing Linkletter.] Conceptual puzzles about "the
law" and "legal obligation" become
acute when a court is con36
fronted with a problem like this.
When Dworkin later seeks to capture Mapp and Linkletter within his
rights thesis, he emphasizes Mapp's ostensible basis in arguments of policy,
rather than principle. 137 Without committing himself to approval of the
result, he seemingly asserts that Linkletter is consistent with the rights thesis
because distributional consistency is not required of policy: if prospective
application of the exclusionary rule announced in Mapp is sufficient to
serve the collective social goal of deterring illegal police conduct, those who
would benefit from retrospective application of Mapp have no claim of right
to such retrospectivity. But consider the cost of this accommodation of the
descriptive aspect of the rights thesis to Mapp and Linkletter: if Mapp does
not establish any newly created rights of criminal defendants and is purely a
rule of policy, the courts are justified under the correlated normative aspects
of the rights thesis in applying that rule on an ad hoc basis.
130. See id. at 91.

131. See id.
132. Id. at 88.
133. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14 (1967).
134. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 14-45.
135. Id. at 14.
136. Id. at 14-15. On the misstatement of the Mapp case as dealing with police procedures
which had not previously been held "constitutionally forbidden," see note 139 infra.
137. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 100.
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There is indeed recent authority to this effect, 138 but given Dworkin's
concern over the rights of individuals against the state this leaves him with
the bathwater of his rights thesis sans the baby of individuated Fourth
Amendment rights. One hopes that the rights thesis does not receive further
vindication, or personal rights regarding criminal procedure further dilution into nonindividuated privileges of policy, by future decisions that hold,
for instance, that only every third valid suppression motion should be
granted, or that illegally obtained evidence should be admissible against
child murderers but not against drug dealers, because this offers a better
balance of collective social goals. Dworkin appears hoisted by his own
absolutes, insofar as he might wish to credit the policy grounds advanced by
the Court in Mapp and Linkletter in support of the exclusionary rule, and
yet contend that the benefits of the rule must be extended to all reasonably
similar cases. If the rule in Mapp is based in part on arguments of principle
and a recognition of rights, no reason exists for denying it retroactive effect
consistently with the rights thesis. If Mapp is based wholly on policy, no
right exists to equal treatment under its rule.
These problems indicate the relevance of my discussion of the Coleman case and my argument that rules of criminal procedure, even when
nonconstitutional in origin, do not fail into either/or categories of individual
rights and collective social goals. Clearly Dworkin must devote more
attention to the matter if he is to accommodate successfully and comprehensively the rules of criminal procedure within his rights thesis; he cannot
adequately deal with Linkletter, for instance, by misstating Mapp. 139 Nor
138. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (federal habeas corpus not available to assert
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule claims of state prisoners); United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338 (1974) (illegally seized evidence admissible in grand jury proceedings). The Court in
Stone noted: "But despite the broad deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule, it has never
been interpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or

against all persons. As in the case of any remedial device, 'the application of the rule has been
restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.'

United States v. Calandra, supra,[414 U.S.] at 348. [Footnote omitted.] Thus, our refusal to
extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings was based on a balancing of the potential

injury to the historic role and function of the grand jury by such extension against the potential
contribution to the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment through the deterrence of police

misconduct ....

428 U.S. at 486-87 (footnote omitted). "The answer [to the habeas corpus

question] is to be found by weighing the utility of the exclusionary rule against the costs of

extending it to collateral review of Fourth Amendment claims." Id. at 489.
139. In characterizing the problem presented by Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965),
at the outset of his explication of his model of rules, see note 136 and accompanying text supra,

Dworkin hypothesizes a Mapp-like case in which the Court "orders some prisoner freed
because the police used procedures that the Court now says are constitutionally forbidden,
although the Court's earlier decisions upheld these procedures." DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 14.

It was held in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-29 (1949), however, that unreasonable searches
and seizures by state police were indeed "constitutionally forbidden" under the due process

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This was explicitly recognized in both Mapp, 367 U.S.
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can he deal with difficult cases of criminal procedure simply by invoking his
"standard civil case" limitation to designate such counterexamples as
inapplicable special cases. So treated, his thesis "threatens to become as
interesting as a tautology." ' 140 The literature 14 1 and, by and large, Dworkin
at 650-54, and Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 630, 635-36. It is relevant to the issue of whether Mapp
was premised purely on "policy" as opposed to "principle" grounds, as Dworkin uses those
terms, that the goal which Mapp purportedly sought to advance regarded the scope of a
previously announced personal right to privacy.
Closer inspection of both Mapp and Linkletter reveals that neither decision offers much
support to the rights thesis, no matter how "asymmetrically" applied. Mapp certainly appealed
to arguments of principle as well as policy and articulated a right rather than a goal: "Having
once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable
against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state
officers is, therefore, constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an
empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic
rights secured by the Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the
whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its
enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than
that which the Constitutionguaranteeshim ...367 U.S. at 660 (emphasis added). Cf. id. at
662 (Black, J., concurring on ground that when Fourth and Fifth Amendments are considered
together, "a constitutional basis emerges which not only justifies but actually requires the
exclusionary rule.").
In Linkletter, Justice Clark, after briefly outlining the history and theory of the problem of
retrospectivity, went on to repudiate the "Blackstonian" view of discovered law, id. at 623-24,
to attribute the emerging American rule of retrospectivity to such positivist advocates as Austin
and Holmes, id. at 623-25, 629, and to articulate that rule as follows: "the actual existence of
the law prior to the determination of unconstitutionality 'is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot aluays be erased by a new
judicial declaration.' " Id. at 625. Moreover, he drew no distinction between civil and criminal
litigation, and claimed that the Court was required to "weigh the merits and demerits of each
case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether
retrospective operation will further or retard its operation." Id. at 627, 629.
The Linkletter Court characterized Mapp as having decided, contrary to Wolf, that the
enforcement of the Fourth Amendment required "the inclusion of the exclusionary rule within
its rights." Id. at 636 (emphasis added). Thus Mapp, whatever its policy reasons, was depicted
as creating a personal, individual right to the exclusion of illegally seized evidence. Retrospectivity was not mandatory because, from the Court's admittedly Austinian point of view, the
right did not exist before Mapp. "We believe that the existence of the Wolf doctrine prior to
Mapp is 'an operative fact ....
' Id. Although erroneous, Wolf remained valid precedent
until the contrary "judgment of this Court. . . . It was the judgment of this Court that changed
the rule and the date of that opinion is the crucial date." Id. at 639.
This closer reading of Linkletter raises serious questions whether, as Dworkin contends,
the Linkletter Court did indeed premise its nonretrospectivity decision on the premise that
Mapp had established no "right to be acquitted." DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 100. Rather,
Linkletter treated Mapp as having created just such a right; because that right had had no
existence prior to the latter case, Mapp did not need to be made retrospective. Linkletter's
appeal to policy lay not in explaining why that right had been created by Mapp, but in
explaining why the balance of collective goals upon which policy depends would be ill-served
by giving prisoners convicted prior to Mapp the benefit of a right which they had not then
possessed because it was not then in existence.
140. Soper, supra note 7, at 506.
141. See, e.g., id. at 474: Dworkin "has advanced a descriptive theory of the AngloAmerican legal system" (footnote omitted); Hart, Law in Perspective, supra note 8, at 547:
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himself, 142 treat the rights thesis as a concept of adjudication, general in
scope, profound in promise. Let us see what light Coleman casts on the
subject.

III. People v. Coleman: A Tale of Three Cases
A. The Facts Below
When John Coleman was convicted by a California court on a felony
charge of grand theft, he faced an indeterminate term of up to ten years in
state prison. 41'3 The sentencing judge chose to suspend Coleman's imprisonment, however, and placed him on probation.'" As a condition of probation, Coleman served a few months in the county jail. Upon his release he
returned to San Francisco, where he took up residence in a hotel with his
"common law" wife, Shirley Singletary.14 5
One night Ms. Singletary encountered a stranger in a bar, danced with
him briefly, and left with his wallet. The man discovered his loss in time to
follow Singletary to her hotel, whereupon he summoned the police. Shortly
thereafter Coleman and Singletary stepped out of the hotel elevator and into
the arms of the law. Coleman denied any knowledge of the wallet but
offered to make good the stranger's loss, claiming to have in his possession
Dworkin posits a "body of principles" from which "rules can be deduced to solve correctly
those hard cases where separate positive constitutional provisions, enactments and precedents
given incomplete, ambiguous or conflicting guidance"; Reynolds, supra note 8, at 579: "Dworkin denies any legitimate place for judicial discretion in the administration of the law." But see
Soper, supra note 7, at 505-06 (noting Dworkin's equivocation concerning "what counts as a
'typical civil case' "); Rights Thesis, supra note 8, at 1172, 1199 (civil case limitation noted

without comment).
142. Besides mentioning the civil case limitation only three times amid the hundreds of
references to the adjudication of hard cases in general, see note 100 supra, Dworkin expressly
refers in his introduction to his "liberal theory of law" and its "general theory of rights."
DWORKIN, supra note 3, at vii, xiv.
143. People v. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867,871,877 n.9, 533 P.2d 1024, 1029, 1034 n.9, 120 Cal.
Rptr. 384, 389, 394 n.9 (1975).
For the relevant penal provision then in effect, see 1953 Cal. Stats., ch. 734, § 1, p. 1998
(current version at CAL. PENAL CODE § 489 (West Supp. 1977)). For an account of the
indeterminate sentencing system then prevailing in California, see Note, Sentencing Criminals
in California-A Study in Haphazard Legislation, 13 STAN. L. REV. 340 (1961); Student
Symposium on the Proposed California Criminal Code, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 525, 527-30
(1972). In 1976 California adopted legislation replacing that system with one emphasizing
determinate sentencing. See 1976 Cal. Stats., ch. 1139, at 4752 (West 1976).
144. 13 Cal. 3d at 871, 533 P.2d at 1029, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
145. Id. at 872, 533 P.2d at 1030, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 390. Chief Justice Wright's use of the
phrase "common law wife" is apparently euphemistic, since California does not recognize
common law marriage. 6 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Husband and Wife § 20

(8th ed. 1974).
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nearly the exact amount which had been stolen. A consensual search of their
hotel room uncovered no evidence, but Coleman and Singletary were
nonetheless arrested for grand theft."4
At their preliminary hearings in the municipal court, both defendants
were held to answer on the grand theft charges. Since the charges were
felonies, their cases were set for trial in the superior court. In proceedings
before that court, Coleman was charged with the less serious offense of
being an accessory after the fact, and the charge that he had been a principal
in the theft was dismissed. Less favorable to Coleman was the superior
court's setting of a hearing six days in advance of his trial, at which juncture
it would consider whether Coleman's probation should be revoked.147
Coleman moved at his revocation hearing for a continuance of that
hearing pending the determination of the concurrent criminal charges
against him. Coleman's motion was based on his claim that the scheduling
of his revocation hearing in advance of his trial had the effect of requiring
the waiver of one federal constitutional right as the price for exercising
another. If he remained silent to avoid self-incrimination at his trial, he
would forfeit his right to be heard in his own defense at his revocation
hearing. If he took the stand at that hearing, any admissions he might make
would accrue to the state's benefit at trial. The court denied Coleman's
motion for a continuance, and he refused to present any evidence in his own
behalf. The matter was submitted on the transcript of the testimony against
Coleman at his preliminary hearing, and his probation was revoked. Coleman appealed, asserting that his right to procedural due process and his right
not to be compelled to incriminate himself operated in conjunction to
guarantee him an opportunity to justify his conduct as a convict on probation
without assisting the state in convicting him again. 148
B. The Law Above
Chief Justice Wright's opinion for a unanimous court in People v.
Coleman1 49 illuminates the play of judicial discretion in hard cases of
criminal procedure. As with most cases in high courts, however, there is a
need to discriminate between what it says and what it shows. The insights it
offers are best understood in the context of two decisions of the United
States Supreme Court which had dealt in inconsistent ways with constitutional claims similar to Coleman's.
146. 13 Cal. 3d at 872, 533 P.2d at 1030, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 871-73, 533 P.2d at 1029-30, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 389-90.
149. 13 Cal. 3d 867, 533 P.2d 1024, 120 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1975).
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1. The United States Supreme Court
Simmons v. United States'5 ° involved a bank robbery defendant whose
suitcase, containing money wrappers from the bank, had been seized during
a warrantless but purportedly consensual search of the home of a codefendant's mother. In order to have "standing" to move to suppress the evidence as illegally seized, the defendant (who was not present when the
house was searched) had to admit his ownership of the suitcase in order to
establish the requisite violation of his "personal" right to privacy. 151 The
suppression motion had been denied, presumably upon the crucial finding of
fact as to consent, and the defendant had been left with having admitted
was subownership of seriously incriminating evidence. 152 This admission
53
sequently introduced against him at trial, over his objection. 1
The United States Supreme Court ordered the reversal of his conviction, Justice Harlan declaring for the Court: "In these circumstances, we
find it intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered
in order to assert another."'' 54 The testimony in question was deemed
voluntary only in an abstract sense;1 55 the Court stated that while testimony
might not always be involuntary as a matter of law simply because it is given
to obtain a benefit, when "the 'benefit' to be gained is that afforded by
56
another provision of the Bill of Rights, an undeniable tension is created." 1
Given his general solicitude for stare decisis, it was somewhat surprising that Justice Harlan again wrote the majority opinion for the Court three
years later, in McGautha v. California.157 In that decision, the Court found
that no impermissible tension between constitutional rights had been created
by a "unitary" system for trying capital cases, in which the jury's determination of punishment was combined with its determination of guilt. 158 The
effect of the unitary system was to force the perpetrator of a homicide who
150. 390 U.S. 377, 379-80 (1968).
151. 390 U.S. at 381, 389-91. California's "vicarious" exclusionary rule whereby illegally
seized evidence is inadmissible against anyone is not required by the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. ComparePeople v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755,290 P.2d 855 (1955) with Alderman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
152. 390 U.S. at 380.
153. See id. at 389 & n.10, 394.
154. Id. at 394.

155. Id. at 393-94.
156. Id. at 394.
157. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
158. Id. at 208-22. A separate portion of the McGautha opinion declared it "quite impossible to say that committing to the untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce
life or death in capital cases is offensive to anything in the Constitution." Id. at 207. Contra,
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (plurality opinion).
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might be able to adduce mitigating circumstances to choose between
admitting guilt in order to plea for mercy or remaining silent at reduced risk
of conviction but at greater risk of capital sentence if convicted.
Justice Harlan took note that the legal system of the United States
required litigants to make many difficult judgments as to how best to
conduct their cases and added: "Although a defendant may have a right,
even of constitutional dimensions, to follow whichever course he chooses,
the Constitution does not by that token always forbid requiring him to
choose. The threshold question is whether compelling the election impairs
159
to an appreciable extent any of the policies behind the rights involved."'
This test was not met in McGautha. The "mere force of evidence" did not
constitute compulsion for purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination, 16° and although that privilege expressed a policy against cruelty, the
choice involved was not unduly harsh in view of "the clear validity of
analogous choices with which criminal defendants and their attorneys are
quite routinely faced,' ' 16 1 such as impeachment by proof of prior convictions upon cross-examination. The right to be heard on the issue of punishment was of dubious constitutional stature, but assuming such a right to
exist, the Court claimed it was adequately fulfilled by the defense counsel's
opportunity to argue for mercy in his summation. 162 Justice Harlan concluded by observing that whatever the individual predilections of the members of the Court, the "Federal Constitution, which marks the limits of our
authority in these cases, does not guarantee trial procedures that are best of
163
all worlds."'
The McGautha opinion seemed intent on leaving ambiguous the status
of the rule announced in Simmons. Justice Harlan declared that Simmons
should be viewed with circumspection, as follows:
[W]e held it unconstitutional for the Federal Government to
use at trial the defendant's testimony given on an unsuccessful
motion to suppress evidence allegedly seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. We concluded that to permit such use created
an unacceptable risk of deterring the prosecution of marginal
Fourth Amendment claims, thus weakening the efficacy of the
exclusionary rule as a sanction for lawful police behavior. This was
surely an analytically sufficient basis for decision."6
The Fourth Amendment claim in Simmons was merely "colorable," and
the Fifth Amendment interests faded into "insubstantiality" when viewed
159. 402 U.S. at 213.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

215.
218-19.
221.
211.
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was not overruled, however, although it was
with hindsight. 65 Simmons
66
1
undermined.
admittedly
2.

The CaliforniaSupreme Court

Coleman's claim was rejected summarily by the court of appeal. The
California Supreme Court granted a hearing upon his petition and, after six
months of deliberation, 167 issued a lengthy opinion.
Mr. Coleman's case was difficult because it presented two different
controversial aspects, consideration of each of which is instructive of judicial perceptions of the nature of legal standards and the scope of judicial
discretion in the resolution of hard cases. First, there was a conspicuous
problem of ambiguous authority. In adjudicating Coleman's rights under the
federal Constitution, the California Supreme Court was controlled in the
first instance not by the text of the Constitution but by the binding precedents of the United States Supreme Court. This decisional authority was
ambiguous both because it was vague with regard to the dimensions of the
rights in question, and because it was conflicting, in view of the tenuous
coexistence of Simmons and McGautha. The question was one not merely
of interpreting precedent, but also of divining the present intentions of a
changing Court. Second, there was a latent problem of novelty, in the sense
of rules being absent rather than being arguably inapplicable. Once California's highest court acquitted itself of its duty to construe and apply the
mandates of the federal Constitution, there would remain the power-and
perhaps the obligation-of the court as seven judges sovereign to turn new
ground in a field of state law unfurrowed by its own precedent.
In the vein in which the opinion itself is structured, I propose to study
the ontogeny of Coleman as if the court were dealing with not one but two
hard cases. Taking in turn each ground for controversy, I wish to examine
the decision to see the nature of the legal standards which Chief Justice
Wright saw as relevant to the decision, the scope of the discretion that those
standards left to the court, and whether the opinion resolved the controversy
in a manner supportive of the theories of either Hart or Dworkin.
165. Id. at 212.
166. Id. "While we have no occasion to question the soundness of the result in Simmons
and do not do so, to the extent that its rationale was based on a 'tension' between constitutional
rights and the policies behind them, the validity of that reasoning must now be regarded as open

to question ....

" Id.

167. Arguments were heard in September of 1974, but no decision was rendered until April
of 1975.
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The Ambiguity of Rules

A. Coleman's Countervailing Rights
The first level of ambiguity concerned the scope of each of Coleman's
asserted rights, insofar as there might be some interrelationship between
those rights. There was no question that Coleman had a "constitutional right
to be permitted to speak in his own behalf at his probation revocation
hearing." 6 8 The United States Supreme Court had explicitly declared that
the opportunity to be heard in person was among the minimum requirements
of due process guaranteed at probation revocation hearings. 169 Similarly, the
United States Supreme Court had squarely held that "the Fifth Amendment's exception from compulsory self-incrimination is also protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by the States." 170 Coleman
having been bound over to the superior court for trial on a felony charge
arising out of the same conduct that was alleged as the basis for the
revocation of his probation, there was no dispute that his concern over selfincrimination was founded on "real dangers, not remote or speculative
possibilities." 171 Thus there was no categoricalambiguity as to whether the
rules of the United States Supreme Court providing rights to an opportunity
to be heard and against compulsory self-incrimination applied in Coleman's
case. There was, however, .the conditional ambiguity of the priority of
application of two rules, each of which was applicable independently of the
other.
Each rule conferred a right rather than imposed a duty; each rule
required that Coleman be given an option. He had been placed in a situation
in which he could not exercise both options, however, and this raised a
question of whether the rule conferring either right was by its terms subordinate to the other. Since the terms of neither right disclosed its interrelationship vis-h-vis the other, ambiguity existed: what was the nature of the
opportunity to be heard at one's revocation hearing, and how compulsory
was the self-incrimination which might result from testifying at such a
hearing?
True to both Hart and Dworkin, the court did not react to this ambiguity
172
like some juridical relic of the supposed era of mechanical jurisprudence,
focusing formalistically on the failure of either rule to require by its literal
168. 13 Cal. 3d at 873, 533 P.2d at 1030, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
169. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488-89 (1972). The Morrissey standards were
made applicable to probation revocation proceedings in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782
(1973).
170. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).

171. Zicarelli v. New Jersey Investigation Comm'n, 406 U.S. 472, 478 (1972).
172. See notes 47 & 54 and accompanying text supra.
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terms that the option thus afforded to a defendant be accommodated with
other similarly guaranteed options to act inconsistently, and thereby concluding that there was no call for accommodation. After reciting the facts,
the opinion set out immediately to examine in contextual terms "a probationer's constitutional right to be permitted to speak in his own behalf at his
probation revocation hearing,"' 173 by reference to the relevant cases of the
United States Supreme Court.174
The opinion emphasized that this right, which it characterized as
assuring a meaningful opportunity to be heard and explain one's actions,
extended to arguments in mitigation and appeals- to justice as well as to
exculpatory arguments. 175 The right served two policies, the foremost being
"to assure informed, intelligent and just revocation decisions."' 76 Thus
" 'the accurate finding of fact and the informed use of discretion' " was
essential to reducing the risk of a revocation unjustifiably depriving a
probationer of his liberty, unnecessarily interrupting a successful effort at
rehabilitation, or " ' imprudently prejudicing the safety of the communi17 7
A second "broad policy objective" of the constitutional guarantee
ty.' "
of an opportunity to testify was to further "the rehabilitative goals of the
penal system"' 78 by treating probationers with " 'basic fairness.' "179
Far from yielding to Coleman's competing right to remain silent, both
of these policies were seriously undermined when the possibility of selfincrimination deterred a probationer from taking advantage of his right to be
heard at his revocation hearing. A probationer allowed to explain his actions
only by jeopardizing his chances of acquittal at a subsequent criminal trial
might well feel railroaded to revocation "without one of the essential
elements of rudimentary fairness-a meaningful chance to speak on his own
behalf."'' 0 Moreover, the intelligent and just exercise of the revoking
court's "broad discretion" would be impaired if the court was deprived of
173. 13 Cal. 3d at 873, 533 P.2d at 1030, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
174. Id. at 873-78, 533 P.2d at 1030-34, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 390-94 (citing, interalia, Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965)).

175. Id. at 873, 533 P.2d at 1030-31, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 390-91.
176. Id. at 873,533 P.2d at 1031, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 391 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.

471, 484 (1972)).
177. Id. at 873, 533 P.2d at 1031, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 391 (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411

U.S. 778, 785 (1973)).
178. Id. at 874 & n.4, 533 P.2d at 1031 & n.4, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 391 & n.4 (citing THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE ON CORRECTIONS, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 82 (1967)).

179. Id. at 874, 533 P.2d at 1031, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 391 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 484 (1972)).
180. Id.
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the probationer's testimony. 181 Himself a superior court judge for many
years, the Chief Justice observed that a probationer, "by definition a
convicted lawbreaker," was "generally at a disadvantage in terms of the
credibility of his testimony" insofar as he might simply seek to contradict
the allegations that he had violated the terms of his probation.' 8 2 The
probationer's testimony was most likely to be probative to the extent that it
added to rather than detracted from the factual picture presented by the state
by explaining the circumstances surrounding the conduct that allegedly
constituted a violation; yet such mitigating evidence, since it generally
involved damaging factual admissions coupled with moral excuses, was
"just what is most likely to be withheld from the court by virtue of the
1 83
probationer's fear of self-incrimination."'
Wright next turned to the various policies underlying the privilege
against self-incrimination and found these constitutional values to be similarly undermined when, instead of being intimidated into silence at his
revocation hearing, the probationer resolved the conflict in the opposite way
by risking self-incrimination in order to testify. 18 4 At least two of the
motivating policies for the privilege against self-incrimination were deemed
to be adversely affected by permitting a probationer's revocation hearing to
be used against him at a subsequent criminal trial for the same alleged
misconduct. First, there was the policy of requiring the prosecution to
shoulder a heavy procedural and evidentiary burden in order to win a
conviction. A " 'fair state-individual balance' "185 at a criminal trial was
maintained by allowing the privilege against self-incrimination to work in
conjunction with the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, so that "the prosecution in a criminal trial
[must] produce sufficient evidence to establish the defendant's guilt before
he must decide whether to remain silent or to testify in his own behalf
",186

This policy of imposing on the prosecution a heavy burden would be
substantially undercut if, by the simple device of moving to revoke probation prior'to trial, the prosecution could achieve a" 'tails we win, heads you
181. Id. Even Dworkin does not dispute that sentencing decisions are properly discretionary in the "strong" sense of the term. See DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 71, 222.
182. 13 Cal. 3d at 874, 533 P.2d at 1031, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
Chief Justice Wright spent the years 1961-68 on the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
and had been a municipal court judge from 1953 until his election to the superior court. K.
ARNOLD, CALIFORNIA COURTS AND JUDGES HANDBOOK 920 (2nd ed. 1973).
183. 13 Cal. 3d at 874, 533 P.2d at 1031, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
184. Id. at 875, 533 P.2d at 1032, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
185. Id. (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)).
186. Id. at 875, 533 P.2d at 1032, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 392 (citing, inter alia, In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 361-64 (1970); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,460 (1966);Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S.
406, 414=16 (1966)).
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lose' position vis-6-vis the probationer,' ' 1 87 because of the lower burden of
proof and laxer rules of evidence, the state might more easily punish a
probationer by revoking probation than by instituting independent criminal
proceedings. Moreover, the state's ability to keep probationers on a shorter
string than other citizens would be artificially enhanced if the probationer
could successfully defend against revocation only by being "forced, in
effect, to be one of the prosecution's principal witnesses in its case-in-chief
at his trial.' 18 s Indeed, Chief Justice Wright suggested that there was as
great a danger of criminal charges being brought just to facilitate probation
revocation by silencing the probationer, as there was of pre-trial revocation
proceedings being brought just to give the prosecution the benefit of the
189
accused's own testimony.
Finally, the court identified a second policy underlying the privilege
against self-incrimination which was incompatible with the revocation procedures employed against probationer Coleman. The privilege was meant to
guard against exposure to a " 'cruel trilemma' of self-accusation, perjury or
injurious silence.'' Especially with regard to an alleged crime of specific
intent such as was involved in Coleman, the conduct of a probationer could
be wholly innocent, and yet his testimony to establish such innocence would
have the effect, before the prosecution had met any burden of going forward
with its own case-in-chief, of establishing many of the elements of his
alleged crime. In order to avoid being incriminated by truthful testimony
about innocent activity, a probationer would either have to commit perjury,
or remain silent and possibly suffer an unjustified revocation of probation, a
revocation made more probable by "the risk that notwithstanding the ideals
of the Fifth Amendment his silence will be taken as an indication that there
are no valid reasons why probation should not be revoked."''
B. Obligation within the "Open Texture"
By considering the various values and policies subserved by the ambiguous rules which had conferred on Coleman his competing rights, Chief
Justice Wright acknowledged implicitly Hart's notions of the "irreducibly
open textured" nature of language and the "relative indeterminacy of aim"
to be expected of rules propounded by mortals unable to anticipate the
future. 192 Coleman's effort at resolving the ambiguity seems at odds, how187. Id. at 876, 533 P.2d at 1033, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
188. Id. at 876-77, 533 P.2d at 1033, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 393.

189. rd. at 876 n.7, 877 n.9, 533 P.2d at 1033 n.7, 1033-34 n.9, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 393 n.7, 39394 n.9.
190. Id. at 878, 533 P.2d at 1034, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 394 (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)).
191. Id. at 878, 533 P.2d at 1034, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 394.,
192. See HART, supra note 14, at 125.
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ever, with Hart's choice between open alternatives, a discretion which is
"very wide. . . even though it may not be arbitrary or irrational." 193 At
least at this stage of the opinion, when the meaning and intent of ambiguous
federal rules were in issue, the court treated its radius of scrutiny as being
strictly circumscribed by authorities less certain than rules, but entitled to no
less respect. The purposes and policies employed for interpretation were
drawn not from the court's intuition, but rather from the same institutional
sources as the ambiguous rules themselves. This carefully documented
process of abstracting evidence of meaning from cases applying the ambiguous rules to analogous situations appears to corroborate Dworkin's contention that courts adhere to legal standards other than rules, which influence
decisions that rules do not compel.
It might be argued that it is hardly a meaningful test of how judges react
to ambiguity in rules of law to study a decision subject to review by a higher
court. In view of the ultimate disposition of Coleman on independent and
apparently adequate state grounds, cutting off the possibility of review by
the United States Supreme Court, 194 this objection may not be relevant to
my use of Coleman as an exemplar of judicial discretion in a hard case. It is
nonetheless worth pursuing, because it evidences a misunderstanding of the
terms of the inquiry.
Useful discussion of how judges react to ambiguity, and whether they
truly exercise a choice between open alternatives, must address the degree
of discretion that judges perceive themselves authorized to exercise. Of
course, judges share the natural tendency to desire approval of their actions,
or at least to avoid the opprobrium of having their decisions explicitly
countermanded. Because this may mean that lower court judges will strive
to reach results which they are most likely to succeed in justifying to their
censors above, it does not follow that lower court judges will tend to eschew
exercise of any gap-filling discretion. The best strategy to avoid reversal
would seem to be to appeal to the same arguments as the higher court would
be expected to follow were it to make the decision itself. This thesis invites
analysis of lower court opinions in order to determine what arguments and
authority judges themselves think other judges on higher courts will view as
appropriate bases for decisions in hard cases. This inquiry is of particular
interest when, as in Coleman, the lower court judges have had to spend a
preponderance of their time deciding hard cases in their alternate capacity as
a state court of last resort.
Lower court decisions in hard cases will differ in two respects from
high court decisions. I have postulated that high court judges decide cases
193. Id. at 124.
194. See notes 269-73 and accompanying text infra.
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under the law as they see it, rather than by resort to their power to act in
disregard of the law. 195 Nonetheless, to the extent that the decisions of such
judges may evince the effects of an awareness of sovereignty in subtle
ways, such as failure to persevere in attempting to ascertain the law for lack
of any sanctions for misperception of the law, those effects should be absent
from the decisions of lower courts. The lower court may perceive some
"trend of decision" or less dignified evidence of subjective attitudes by its
reviewing court, and may cater to those assumed attitudes in order to avoid
reversal, but unless such perceptions have their origin in unofficial communications between judges, they represent merely another array of arguments culled from reported cases by which the extent of ambiguity and its
proper resolution are conventionally formulated. Such perceptions are,
indeed, commonly stated on the face of the lower court decisions which they
96

color. 1
There is a second aspect in which lower court decisions of hard cases
differ from high court decisions. A lower court lacks the ability to overrule
mistakes by a higher court; therefore, the former tribunals must treat
conflicting precedent as ambiguous rather than mistaken, and appeal to
arguments of rationalization rather than repudiation. This was the position
of the California Supreme Court regarding Coleman's federal constitutional
claims. The overruling power of a high court can be overemphasized,
however. Hart and Dworkin agree that a court cannot afford to take lightly
its power to reject its own rules. Hart confines the overruling of precedent to
the fringe of adjudication and suggests that it threatens "the prestige
gathered by courts from their unquestionably rule-governed operations over
195. See notes 25-27 supra.
196. See, e.g., People v. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867, 887 n.18, 533 P.2d 1024, 1040 n.18, 120
Cal. Rptr. 384, 400 n.18. See also Spector Motor Serv. v. Walsh, 139 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1943),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Spector Motor Co. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944), on
remand sub nom. Spector Motor Serv. v. O'Connor, 181 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1950), rev'd, 340
U.S. 602 (1951). That case concerned the validity of a state tax upon the activities of a foreign
corporation engaged solely in interstate commerce. In an opinion by Judge Charles Clark, the
Second Circuit's first decision held that pre-New Deal precedent immunizing from state taxation companies engaged exclusively in interstate commerce was no longer controlling: "[I]f
. . . our duty were limited to picking the closest unoverruled analogy in reported cases and
following that blindly and mechanically, we should hold that these cases . . . foreclosed all
further discussion. . . .[However, we] must determine with the best exercise of our mental
powers of which we are capable that law which in all probability will be applied to these litigants
or to others similarly situated. If this means the discovery and applying of a 'new doctrinal
trend' in the Court,. . . this is our task to be performed directly and straightforwardly, rather
than 'artfully' dodged:" 139 F.2d at 814 (citation omitted).
These brave words provoked equally stirring phrases from Judge Learned Hand, expressing his disagreement not of principle but of its application: "[It is not] desirable for a lower
court to embrace the exhilarating opportunity of anticipating a doctrine [sic] which may be in
the womb of time, but whose birth is distant; on the contrary I conceive that the measure of its
duty is to divine, as best it can, what would be the event of an appeal in the case before it." Id.
at 823 (Hand, J., dissenting).
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the vast, central areas of the law." 197 As Dworkin has persuasively argued,
the overruling of precedent is unsettling to positivists, forcing them to
accept that there must be legally binding standards other than rules, or rules
themselves would lack binding force because they could always be discretionarily overruled; 198 but Dworkin must also place limits upon the
departure from precedent, because he views a judge's task as one of
constructing the theory of decision most consistent with institutional history
199
and morality.
The reasoning of Coleman is an instructive example of how all judges
respond to ambiguity in precedent when there is no possibility of overruling
the cases contributing to the ambiguity. Coleman shows judges working
within the "open texture" of prior rules in seeking to justify the result of a
subsequent case. Within this gap in the law, however, the decisional process
seems far from legislative; although the opinion does seem directed at
striking a balance between competing interests of varying weights, both the
interests and their relative weights are identified from and justified by
existing authority. 2 °° The appeal is not to the public welfare as conceived by
the court, but to the political aims that the ambiguous rules were perceived
as seeking to advance or protect. 20 1 The extent of authority cited to support
the identification of particular aims in Coleman suggests a felt sense of
obligation to measure possible interpretations of the rules conferring upon
probationers the rights to be heard and not to incriminate themselves against
the political aims underlying those rules. The "open texture" of ambiguity
in the law does not appear to present judges with opportunities for discretion
unconstrained by obligation, but rather exposes judges to countervailing
fields of force, in which the surrounding rules pull against one another so as
to align the court's decision at some point of equilibrium between them.
C. The Policy Counterexample
Although Coleman thus substantiates Dworkin's position that legal
standards other than rules restrict discretion when judges confront ambiguity
in the law, it does not support his thesis in its entirety. The opinion by Chief
Justice Wright quite conspicuously refers to arguments of policy in seeking
to discern the scope of Coleman's rights. 20 2 Of course, Dworkin has many
197. HART, supra note 14, at 150.
198. See DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 36-38.
199. See notes 86-90, 97-99, and accompanying text supra. Dworkin instructs Hercules that
he cannot make "impudent use" of the device of taking "any compatible piece of history as a
mistake," for then "the requirement of consistency would not be a genuine requirement at all."
DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 121. It is not clear why loose use of the device of overruling
precedent is deemed impudent rather than imprudent.
200. See notes 173-91 and accompanying text supra.
201. See DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 91.
202. 13 Cal. 3d at 873-78, 533 P.2d at 1030-34, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 390-94; see notes 173-91 and
accompanying text supra.
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devices for converting apparent appeals to policy into invocations of principle which support his rights thesis. 203 Moreover, a court may simply use the
word "policy" in a more inclusive sense than Dworkin's, as denominating
the goals served by a rule regardless of whether those goals serve individual
or social interests. 2°4 Thus when Coleman refers to the "many and varied
policies underlying the privilege against self-incrimination' '205 as including
an inherent procedural bias against the prosecution and the avoidance of
circumstantial as well as physical cruelty to defendants, the opinion is
speaking of principle for Dworkin's purposes, because these many and
varied policies justify the privilege in terms of an individual's moral claim to
certain political trumps against the otherwise overweening power of the
majority.2 °6 Moreover, Dworkin contends that some appeals to policy are
also appeals to the competing abstract rights of some group not coextensive
with-the community at large; 20 7 thus, appeals to policies of national defense
or public safety may be seen as appeals to the abstract rights of particular
soldiers or citizens whose security is threatened. 20 8 To the extent that
Coleman found that the right to be heard at a revocation hearing served as a
means of avoiding " 'imprudently prejudicing the safety of the community,' "209 Dworkin might claim that this is such an appeal to abstract rights.
In at least one respect, however, Coleman looks for guidance in construing
an ambiguous rule by relying on what is clearly an argument of policy in the
Dworkinian sense. 210 When Coleman considers the effect that a passive
interpretation of the rule granting probationers an opportunity to be heard at
their revocation hearings would have on the rehabilitative goals of the penal
system, the court is unmistakably measuring the dimensions of a personal
right by examining collective social interests, not the moral claims of
2 11
individuals against society.
203.
204.
205.
206.

See note 77 supra.
See notes 76-77 and accompanying text supra.
13 Cal. 3d at 875 & n.5, 533 P.2d at 1032 & n.5, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 392 & n.5.
See DWORKIN, supra note 3, at xi. See note 86 supra.

207. Id. at 99.
208. Id. at 93.

209. 13 Cal. 3d at 873, 533 P.2d at 1031, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 391 (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
411 U.S. 778, 785 (1973)).
210. See note 77 supra.
211. An argument positing that the court might have been referring to some "right of
rehabilitation" possessed by prisoners would be insupportable in light of the authority given at
this point in Coleman. See 13 Cal. 3d at 874 n.4, 533 P.2d at 1031 n.4, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 391 n.4
(citing THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF

JUSTICE, TASK FORCE ON CORRECTIONS, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 82 (1967)). The

citation is to the first page of chapter eight, "The Legal Status of Convicted Persons," where
the Task Force declared: "There is increasing doubt as to the propriety of treating this large

group of persons as, in varying degrees, outcasts from soc.iety. And there is increasingrecognition that such treatment is not in the ultimateinterestsof society. Denying offenders any chance
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To the extent that the court in Coleman sought to construe a "judicial
enactment" of the United States Supreme Court, Dworkin disallows reliance on arguments of policy even to determine what rights such an
enactment has created, because he maintains that judicial enactments, as
opposed to statutes, may be based only on arguments of principle. 2 12 To the
extent that the court in Coleman was seeking to construe the Constitution
directly, in the absence of a settled interpretation by the United States
Supreme Court, Dworkin is equally insistent that such a decision must be
premised on principle rather than policy. He defines constitutionalism as
"the theory that the majority must be restrained to protect individual
rights," 2 13 and treats constitutional adjudication as raising "the issue of
what moral rights an individual has against the state.''214 Thus "[t]he
difficult clauses of the Bill of Rights, like the due process and equal
protection clauses, must be understood as appealing to moral concepts rather
than laying down particular conceptions; therefore a court which undertakes
the burden of applying these clauses fully as law. . . must be prepared to
frame and answer questions of political morality." ' 21 5 Coleman'suse of the
rehabilitative goals of the penal system to weigh alternative constructions of
the right to due process in terms of their social utility must be construed as a
counter-example to Dworkin's rights thesis.
D. The Conflict of Rules
I have thus far examined the process of resolving in Coleman the
ambiguous scope of the right of a probationer both to an opportunity to be
to challenge arbitraryassertions of power by correctional officials, and barring them from
legitimate opportunities such as employment, are inconsistent with the correctionalgoal of
rehabilitation, which emphasizes the need to instill respect for and willingness to cooperate
with society and to help the offender assume the role of a normal citizen." (Emphasis added.)
Coleman is certainly not alone among recent criminal procedure cases in which the scope
of a claim of right has been ascertained in part by reference to social goals. See, e.g., Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), where the Court ruled that the due process protections there
held to be constitutionally required in prison disciplinary hearings were "not graven in stone,"
and continued: "As the nature of the prison disciplinary process changes in future years,
circumstances may then exist which will require further consideration and reflection of this
Court. It is our view, however, that the procedures we have now required in prison disciplinary
proceedings represent a reasonable accommodation between the interests of the inmates and
the needs of the institution." Id. at 572.
212. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 111 n.1.
213. Id. at 142.
214. Id. at 149.
215. Id. at 147. There is, of course, no "equal protection clause" as such in the Bill of
Rights. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). Although Bolling held that "discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process," since "the concepts of equal
protection and due process . . . are not mutually exclusive," it cautioned that "we do not
imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases." Id.; accord, Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976).
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heard at his revocation hearing, and to avoid self-incrimination at a pending
trial for the same conduct as was at issue in the revocation proceedings.
Given the outcome in Coleman of that process, whereby it was determined
that these rights could not be reconpiled by construing one as subordinate to
the other, and given further that these rights were not inherently irreconcilable but could each be enjoyed by, respectively, postponing the revocation
hearing or granting Coleman immunity from the use at trial of statements
made at a pre-trial revocation hearing, it might seem that some such
accommodation was a matter of constitutional right. This would certainly
follow under the rights thesis, for if constitutional rights are really individual
rights against the state, rather than dispensations of privilege at the convenience of the majority, then whatever social cost might be entailed by the
accommodation of competing constitutional rights would not be a permissible basis for limiting either right. The cost of the accommodation would be
part of the price of having a Constitution; whether this price was too high for
some particular right would be a matter of social policy and therefore
beyond the purview of the courts.
The Coleman court deemed itself governed not by the rights thesis,
however, but by the Constitution as construed by the United States Supreme
Court. That Court had considered the problem of tension between countervailing constitutional rights not once but twice, with seemingly conflicting
results. In Simmons the Court had first acted consistently with the rights
thesis, declaring a failure to alleviate such tension "intolerable. ' 21 6 The
later decision in McGautha had reached an opposite result, not by an
outright disavowal of Simmons, but by a novel analysis of the nature of the
rights in question, which had led it to conclude that, properly construed, the
supposedly countervailing rights asserted in both Simmons and McGautha
had created no significant tension at all. 2 17 This left in considerable doubt
the rule governing situations where, even in light of McGautha, undeniable
tension was found to exist, because requiring a choice between constitutionally guaranteed options did indeed lead to "appreciable" impairment of
"the policies behind the rights involved.' 218 The MeGautha test of appreciable impairment was obviously paralleled by Coleman's effort at construing
the vague dimensions of the opportunity to be heard and the privilege
against self-incrimination to see if either could be reconciled with the other.
The Coleman court had by this process seemingly found appreciable impairment in Coleman's case, and had to decide what to make of it.
216.
217.
ing text
218.

Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968).
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183,208-22 (1971); see notes 157-66 and accompanysupra.
402 U.S. at 213.
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However apparent McGautha's influence may have been from the
outset of the Coleman opinion, neither McGautha nor Simmons was mentioned by Chief Justice Wright until after it had been established that
''requiring a probationer to choose between testifying at his revocation
hearing and incriminating himself at a later trial creates a tension between
countervailing constitutional rights." 2 19 This allowed the court to consider
whether it was constitutionally compelled to obviate this tension without
simultaneously becoming mired in McGautha's murky reasoning, which
proceeds backwards from its conclusion that there was no such duty to the
premise that there was no such tension. Analysis of McGautha's strict
standard for constitutionally required accommodation would in this way not
obfuscate the established fact that, whether accommodation was required or
not, there was an inescapable tension between constitutional rights in Coleman's case which could not be waived away with the wand of redefinition.
From this perspective, the Coleman court approached the SimmonsMcGautha schism with the admonition that current federal law on the duty
220
to accommodate countervailing constitutional rights was quite confused.
The authorship by Justice Harlan of both Simmons and McGautha was
deemed a significant indication that the latter decision meant to reconsider
the rationale of Simmons rather than merely distinguish the prior case on its
facts. 221 The gloss provided by McGautha was that "Simmons should not
be read as invalidating all procedures which produce some tension between
constitutional rights";222 tension might exist and yet be permissible under
the new test of appreciable impairment, which McGautha posited as the
"threshold question" in a determination whether tension was constitutionally significant. 223 Chief Justice Wright declared:
From the manner of its application in McGautha, it appears that
this test is likely to be more dispositive than the court's
"threshold" characterization would imply. The determinations of
what are constitutional policies, when such a policy is impaired,
and whether the impairment is "appreciable," would seem to involve value judgments controlling of the question of the permissibility in a given context of procedures
224 imposing upon litigants a
choice between constitutional rights.
Thus, for example, McGautha had found the privilege against self-incrimination affected but not offended by unitary trials in capital cases, not by
analyzing the degree of impairment but, rather, by relying on the assump219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

13 Cal. 3d at 878, 533 P.2d at 1034, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
Id.
Id. at 879, 533 P.2d at 1035, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
Id. at 880, 533 P.2d at 1036, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
Id.
Id.
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tion of the " 'clear validity of analogous choices . . . quite routinely

faced.' "225
The Coleman court was clearly uncertain of what validity, if any,
Simmons retained. McGautha had made little effort to reconcile its reasoning with that which had preceded it in Simmons, yet had not disavowed
the result reached in Simmons. 226 Coleman concluded that McGautha thus
"implied that Simmons should have been decided on the basis of the court's
supervisory powers over federal trials rather than the mandates of the
Constitution. "227
Chief Justice Wright then looked for guidance to cases in the lower
federal courts which had considered the Simmons-McGautha problem, and
found that they had only compounded the confusion. One First Circuit case
involved issues identical to Coleman, but had been decided by a split
court. 228 The majority had ruled that a probationer could, under McGautha,
validly be put to the strategic election between testifying and remaining
silent. 229 The dissent had argued that the Constitution compelled the state
either to postpone the revocation proceeding pending trial, or to grant the
2 0
probationer immunity from the use of his testimony at a subsequent trial. 1
For authority, the dissent had relied on another decision by the same
circuit,23 1 in which a prison inmate faced with a disciplinary hearing had
been held to be constitutionally entitled to immunity from subsequent use of
his testimony in the disciplinary hearing; McGautha had been distinguished
as a case involving a procedural context where remaining silent was a viable
strategic alternative, and was thus deemed to be dissimilar to a situation
involving a prison disciplinary hearing with its more minimal safeguards
against prejudicial fact-finding. 232 Yet this latter case had just been vacated
by the Supreme Court 233 for reconsideration in light of the Court's newly
articulated minimum requirements of procedural due process for prison
disciplinary hearings. 234
225. Id. at 881, 533 P.2d at 1036, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 396 (citing McGautha v. California, 402
U.S. 183, 215 (1971)).
226. 402 U.S. at 212-13.
227. 13 Cal. 3d at 881, 533 P.2d at 1037, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 397.
228. Flint v. Mullen, 499 F.2d 100 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1974).
229. 499 F.2d at 103.
230. Id. at 105-06 (Coffin, C.J., dissenting).
231. Palmigiano v. Baxter, 487 F.2d 1280 (1st Cir. 1973) (Palmigiano I), vacated and remanded, 418 U.S. 908 (1974), on remand, 510 F.2d 534 (1st Cir. 1974) (Palmigiano II), rev'd,
425 U.S. 308 (1976). See note 243 infra.
232. Palmigiano 1, 487 F.2d at 1288 n.21.
233. Id. at 1280 (1st Cir. 1973), vacatedandremanded, 418 U.S. 908 (1974).
234. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
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These inconclusive precedents led Chief Justice Wright to consider the
broader problem of concurrent civil and criminal proceedings. Several cases
had discussed aspects of the plight of criminal defendants who were
threatened with the loss of property in concurrent civil proceedings arising
out of the same facts as their prosecutions. 235 Although the responses of the
deciding courts had varied, the alleviation of tension between constitutional
rights in concurrent criminal and civil proceedings had consistently been
"treated as within the province of a court's discretion in seeking to assure
the sound administration of justice,''236 rather than as a matter of constitutional right. The culmination of Coleman's analysis of the confused federal
law on countervailing constitutional rights was the proposal of a theory of
decision which would account consistently for all the examined cases. This
theory originated in the premise that the constitutional obligation to alleviate
rights could be ascertained by resort to
tension between constitutional
"spectral analysis. " 2 37 All the relevant cases involved a criminal prosecution and some sort of concurrent or ancillary proceeding, in connection with
which the claim of countervailing rights arose. At one end of the spectrum,
as in the case of prison disciplinary hearings, the concurrent proceedings
had the potential of imposing serious personal deprivations, while providing
minimal procedural protection against an arbitrary outcome; at the other end
of the spectrum, where civil litigation was involved, the need for accommodation was deemed to be far less compelling, and did not appear to be of
constitutional dimensions.23 8 This theory had its inherent limits, however.
With the particular circumstances of each case determining its position on
the spectrum, "there emerge[d] the infeasibility of propounding a constitutional rule of universal applicability. "239
The Coleman court was thus left in some doubt, despite its best efforts,
as to just what was the appropriate disposition of Coleman's claims under
federal law. It had already noted that a probationer's poor procedural
posture at a revocation hearing might be further eroded by the probationer's
failure to testify at that hearing. 2 4° Certainly the deprivation suffered by
Coleman as a result of the adverse outcome of his revocation hearing (a term
of up to ten years in prison) 241 was very serious; this would seem to place
him near the prison disciplinary hearing end of the court's spectrum, where
235. See Gordon v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 427 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1970); In re Penn
Cent. Sec. Litigation, 347 F. Supp. 1347 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
236. 13 Cal. 3d at 885, 533 P.2d at 1039, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
237. Id. at 886, 533 P.2d at 1040, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 400.
238. Id. at 885-86, 533 P.2d at 1039-40, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 399-400.
239. Id. at 886, 533 P.2d at 1040, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 400.
240. Id. at 874, 876, 533 P.2d at 1031, 1033, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 391, 393; see text accompanying notes 182 & 187 supra.

241.

13 Cal. 3d at 877 n.9, 533 P.2d at 1033 n.9, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 393 n.9.
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it had theorized that accommodation might be constitutionally compelled. 242
Yet the court clearly felt uncomfortable with this conclusion, no matter how
theoretically sound: there was a more subtle message in McGautha which
adverted implicitly to the changing judicial philosophy of the members of
the United States Supreme Court and led the Coleman court "to be espe243
cially cautious of perceiving federal constitutional error in this case."
E. Discretion Discounted
Although the Coleman court thus decided to leave unanswered the
federal constitutional question before it, all of the groundwork for such a
decision had been prepared. By construing the interrelationship of Coleman's competing rights, the court showed adherence to legal standards other
than rules in somewhat the fashion articulated by Dworkin. The standards
influencing its decision were broader than Dworkin deems proper, extending to matters of social goals as well as individual rights, 2' but even so the
court did not display discretion. In its reaction to the ambiguity created by
the coexistence of McGautha and Simmons, the Coleman court offers
further corroboration of some aspects of Dworkin's theory of adjudication.
The court's reference to previous decisions of courts of coordinate or
inferior jurisdiction in seeking to resolve the conflict between McGautha
242. Id. at 885-86, 533 P.2d at 1039-40, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 399-40.
243. Id. at 887 n.18, 533 P.2d at 1040 n.18, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 400 n.18. The Coleman
court's caution was well advised. It is virtually certain today that the United States Supreme
Court would not uphold Coleman's federal constitutional claim. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425
U.S. 308 (1976) (Palmigiano II). The Court there held that no Fifth Amendment violation was
suffered by a state prison inmate who had been charged in prison disciplinary proceedings with
inciting a potential riot, informed that he might be prosecuted on criminal charges for the same
conduct, and told at the hearing that he had a right to remain silent but that his silence would be
held against him. The crucial elements, according to the Court, were that the inmate's silence
alone was insufficient under state law to support an adverse finding at the disciplinary hearing,
and that the hearing itself was a civil rather than criminal proceeding. Id. at 317-19. See also
Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 97 S. Ct. 2132, 2138 n.5 (1977) ("Baxterdid no more than permit an
inference to be drawn in a civil case from a party's refusal to testify."). The "civil case" label,
justified in the Baxter opinion because disciplinary proceedings "involve the correctional
process and important state interests other than conviction of crime," 425 U.S. at 319, a
statement no less applicable to probation and parole revocation proceedings, must have come
as a surprise to the inmate in question, who as a result of losing his "civil case" was "placed in
'punitive segregation' for 30 days." Id. at 313. Presumably, his disciplinary record also had an
impact on his chances for parole, and therefore on his overall length of incarceration. Even
more astounding, however, is Baxter's characterization of the Fifth Amendment as having
"little to do with a fair trial." Id. at 319. All of this caused Justice Brennan in dissent to voice
the fervent hope that: "[i]f this Court's insensitivity to the Fifth Amendment violation present
in this case portends still more erosion of the privilege, state courts and legislatures will
remember that they remain free to afford protections of our basic liberties as a matter of state
law." Id. at 338-39 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
244. See 13 Cal. 3d at 874 n.4, 533 P.2d at 1031 n.4, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 391 n.4; see note 211
and accompanying text supra.
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and Simmons presents a striking illustration of Dworkin's phenomenon of
the gravitational force of a decision "on later decisions even when those
decisions lie outside its particular orbit." 245 This general gravitational force
of precedent supports Dworkin's assertion that" j]udges do not decide hard
cases in two stages, first checking to see where the institutional constraints
end, and then setting the books aside to stride off on their own. The
institutional constraints they sense are pervasive and endure to the decision
itself." 246
There remains the question whether these institutional constraints
which do seem to have influenced the Coleman court displaced all discretion on the part of its individual members. I doubt that such constraints do
more than define limits to the range of decision; a given decision will vary
within the permissible range according to the mettle of the deciding judges
and the mass of authority they can master. If the attitudes displayed in
Coleman are a guide, however, it would seem such variations are more the
product of varying perceptions of precedent and perserverance in examining
it than of judicial exercise of an individual discretion.
In situations such as Coleman, where there is ambiguous authority
which cannot be overruled, the choices to be made by judges are more
human than legal. Given intellects of mortal dimension, how hard will
judges strain to separate their own political aims from those underlying the
ambiguous authority which they seek to apply? This question is not answered simply by asserting a duty to determine the single right answer. The
duration for which any mind can tolerate the centrifugal forces of ratiocination is limited; some elements of a decision must be accepted at some point
in the decisional process as sufficiently tested against "political philosophy
and institutional detail"'24 7 to be certain. The choice as to any given element
in any given case may seem discretionary, but even it, I suspect, is " 'in248
stinct with an obligation,' imperfectly expressed."

V.

The Discretionary Alternative

As I announced earlier, it has been useful to treat Coleman as if it were
two separate cases, each involving distinct issues of controversiality. 249 I
have completed examination of Coleman as a case in which a court without
the competence to overrule troublesome precedent tried to construct a
feasible theory of decision. In this circumstance, the Coleman court did not
245.
246.
247.
248.

DWORKIN, supra note 3, at I11.
Id. at 86-87.
Id. at 107.
Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 91, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (1917) (Car-

dozo, J.).
249. See text and accompanying notes 167-68 supra.
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seek to displace doubt with discretion, but displayed a serious concern for
justification as it sought to resolve ambiguity in the fashion most consistent
with the policies underlying ambiguous rules and the results reached by
similarly situated courts.
The Coleman opinion suggests just how strong the sense of obligation
is for a court confronting a hard case involving the ambiguous precedents of
a higher court. The opinion flows vigorously through the demonstration of
the tension between Coleman's rights, proceeds fitfully through the analysis
of Simmons, McGautha, and the related lower court cases, and then literally
grinds to a halt. The opinion fairly proclaims its evolution: a seemingly
powerful case of the "intolerable" tension denounced by Simmons has
crumbled as the court's analysis reveals the extent to which McGautha has
eviscerated that prior ruling. The lower court cases involving concurrent
civil and criminal proceedings, although presenting less compelling circumstances, have left accommodation to the trial court's discretion; the only
post-McGautha precedent supporting federal relief for Coleman has been
vacated; a new majority of the Supreme Court is coalescing under a banner
of minimal procedural standards to be imposed on the states under the
Constitution. The result is that, in the process of justifying its theory of
decision, the court has lost confidence in it; the court's sincerity in following legal standards has forced it to recognize that its initial theory may be
wrong.
This process compelled the court to confront a new issue, however. If
Coleman were not entitled to relief under federal law, should he be left in
statu quo? There were two grounds for a decision under state law. As to
one, the rules of decision were in great flux; as to the other, the court had
undoubted discretion.
A. The State Constitution
One basis for action was theCalifornia Constitution's guarantees of the
right to due process and the privilege against self-incrimination, phrased in
substantially identical terms to the corresponding provisions of the federal
Constitution. 2 0 This basis was not discussed in the opinion, but it raises
interesting jurisprudential questions which I wish merely to broach.
If Dworkin is correct, the court would have no discretion in granting or
denying relief under the state constitution, nor in framing the scope of that
relief. Constitutions, to Dworkin, are not repositories of power for the
amusement or gratification of judges, but are solemn guarantees of fundamental moral rights against the state.251 Yet if constitutional construction
250. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 15.
251. See notes 213-15 and accompanying text supra.
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requires "a theory of the constitution, in the shape of a complex set of
principles and policies that justify that scheme of government," 252 if "a
constitutional theory requires judgments about complex issues of institutional fit, as well as judgments about political and moral philosophy,' 253 and if
a precedent really has a gravitational force beyond the lines of authority of
reviewing courts, a construction of the state constitution at variance from the
authoritative construction of the parallel provision of the federal Constitution would suggest that one or the other construction is mistaken.
In some respects there may be significant differences in the "political
philosophy and institutional detail"254 of the states as opposed to the nation
as a whole, but these are likely to be exceptional. If the state and federal
constitutions apply the same terms to the same society, and are construed to
produce different results, the latter construction necessarily implies that the
former was mistaken. Yet mistakes are not a tolerable phenomenon in
Dworkin's theory of adjudication; they diminish the distributional consistency of rights upon which his theory is based.1 5 Moreover, if an independent construction of a state constitution is in effect a finding that the federal
construction is a mistake, what of the duty of the judge to resist imprudent
use of this device, and to limit the number and character of the events to be
disposed of in that way? How can a judge compelled to find a single right
answer have any power to moderate the finding of prior mistakes? Dworkin
phrases it in terms of the comparative strength of a theory of decision and
declares that "a justification that designates part of what is to be justified as
mistaken is prima facie weaker than one that does not." 25 6 This would seem
to chill the independent construction of state constitutions; 57 one cannot
help but wonder if that is really Dworkin's intent.
B. The Supervisory Rule
There were less abstract reasons at hand to motivate the Coleman court
not to look to the state constitution as a source of relief for Coleman. Chief
Justice Wright was at the center of competing wings of a court at odds over
252. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 107.
253. Id. at 117.

254. Id.at 107.
255. See note 199 and accompanying text supra.
256. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 122.
257. Although there have been notable exceptions, see, e.g., People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d
628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972) (capital punishment); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d
584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971) (school financing), generally the independent state
interpretation is the successor in time to the federal construction. See,e.g., People v. Allen, 18
Cal. 3d 520, 557 P.2d 65, 134 Cal. Rptr. 774 (1976) (self-incrimination); People v. Disbrow, 16
Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976) (Miranda-impeachment); People v.
Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975) (search and seizure).
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the propriety of independent state constitutional construction, and at the
time of Coleman he was in the process of conversion from opposing
independent constructions to accepting them in compelling circumstances.25 8 Moreover, in Reynolds v. Superior Court,259 he had recently
written for an unanimous court an opinion that touched upon the very
privilege against self-incrimination under state law that would have had to
become the linchpin for state constitutional relief for Coleman.
In Reynolds the court had dealt with the propriety of a trial court's
order that a defendant in a criminal proceeding give pre-trial notice of an alibi
defense. The United States Supreme Court had upheld a "notice-of-alibi"2
rule against federal constitutional attack on self-incrimination grounds, 60
but Chief Justice Wright had found that the lower court's order presented
"delicate and difficult questions of constitutional law, both state and federal. "261 The federal issues arose from discrepancies between the order under
review and the procedures for notice-of-alibi approved by the United States
Supreme Court; the state issues arose because notwithstanding the contrary
federal holding, the "privilege [against self-incrimination] is also secured to
the people of California by our state Constitution, whose construction is left
to this court, informed but untrammelled by the United States Supreme
Court's reading of parallel federal provisions." 26 2 The California Supreme
Court was already "on record as being considerably more solicitous of the
privilege against self-incrimination than federal law currently requires.
Thus, there is no foregone answer to the question. . . whether notice-ofalibi discovery procedures in general are permissible under the California
Constitution." 2 63 Reynolds went on to draw a distinction between judicial
rulemaking inspired or required by constitutional limitations on the power of
government, and rulemaking that would merely grant to the government
rights that it might legislatively create for itself. 264 The latter form of rulemaking was disfavored because of the constitutional conflict of interest
which might arise if a court were to try to pass objectively on the constitu258. See People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975)

(Wright, C.J., concurring) (independent construction of state constitution by four-to-three
vote). Compare People v. Nudd, 12 Cal. 3d 204,524 P.2d 844, 115 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1974) (Wright,

C.J., concurring) (federal construction governs state constitution by four-to-three vote) with
People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976) (independent
construction of state constitution by four-to-three vote) andid. at 116,545 P.2d at 281, 127 Cal.

Rptr. at 369 (Wright, C.J., concurring).
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

12 Cal. 3d 834, 528 P.2d 45, 117 Cal. Rptr. 437 (1974).
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
12 Cal. 3d at 842, 528 P.2d at 49, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 441.
Id.
Id. at 843, 528 P.2d at 50-51, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 442-43.
Id. at 845-46, 528 P.2d at 52-53, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 444-45.
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tionality of any such procedure that might result. 265 By contrast, Coleman
presented the opposite situation described in Reynolds as being appropriate
for the court to fashion procedural rules decisionally in order to "effectuate
the protections constitutionally guaranteed to an otherwise helpless accused.,"266 This was the basis on which the court had promulgated its most
famous supervisory rule: the exclusionary rule rendering inadmissible illegally seized evidence six years before that rule had been imposed on the states
2 67
by the United States Supreme Court.
The California precedent of using a supervisory rule to exclude illegally seized evidence made the formulation of a supervisory rule in Coleman
all the more appropriate. The Coleman court had perceived in McGautha's
refusal to repudiate the result in Simmons, while simultaneously disavowing
its rationale, the implication that Simmons, involving a trial in federal court,
should have been premised upon supervisory powers rather than constitutional law.2 68 Thus the decision of Coleman on supervisory grounds would
lend it an appealing consistency; Coleman could be decided under the aegis
of Simmons after all, notwithstanding McGautha's conflict with that case.
C. The Rule of People v. Coleman
Chief Justice Wright accordingly announced "that clothing our adjudication of the issues before us in constitutional raiment would be not only
unwise but also unnecessary.'"269 The court could act on nonconstitutional
grounds unavailable to federal courts so as "to insure that the administration
of justice in California operates as fairly as is feasible, by insisting to the
utmost practicable extent that arbitrary factors not be allowed to influence
the judicial decision-making process." 27 0 Under the federal Constitution,
"notions of federalism" might limit demands for procedural fairness to the
rudimentary rather than the reasonable, but relief was to be accorded
Coleman through the court's supervisory powers to the end that "our legal
system realize its ideal, 'that the judicial should be equated with the
just.' "271

The opinion then declared as a judicial rule of evidence that the
testimony of a probationer at his revocation hearing and any evidence
derived from that testimony were henceforth inadmissible upon timely
objection at subsequent, factually related criminal proceedings; it was said
that "[t]his exclusionary rule allows the state to continue to press for
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

Id. at 845-46, 528 P.2d at 52, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 444.
Id. at 847-48, 528 P.2d at 54, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
See People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
13 Cal. 3d at 881, 533 P.2d at 1037, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 397.
13 Cal. 3d at 886, 533 P.2d at 1040, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 400.
Id. at 888, 533 P.2d at 1041, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 401.
Id. (citation omitted).
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revocation of probation either before or after a probationer's trial on related
charges, but insures that this scheduling discretion will not be influenced by
the illegitimate desire to gain an unfair advantage at trial."'272 By providing
protection coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination, the rule also permitted the court to leave unresolved Coleman's
constitutional claims.273
The opinion concluded with highly detailed guidelines on the application of the new exclusionary rule. The prosecution must give advance notice
of its intention to adduce possibly excludable evidence sufficient to permit
objection before prejudicial exposure of the evidence to a jury.2 74 In making
his objection, the probationer-defendant must establish the connection between the criminal charges being tried and the "circumstances in issue at his
probation revocation hearing";275 the burden then shifts to the prosecution
to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the criminal and
revocation proceedings are not so related. Similarly, if the objectionable
evidence is not the revocation hearing testimony itself but is allegedly
derived therefrom, the probationer-defendant must bear the burden of producing evidence of such derivation and the prosecution must then disprove
that derivation by a preponderance of the evidence.2 76 Although the opinion
modeled these procedures after "those applicable to a claim that evidence
has been gained directly or indirectly through an illegal search or seizure, a
coerced confession, or some other sort of illegal or improper official conduct, "277 it noted that this body of law was procedurally "somewhat vague,
presumably because courts are more troubled by whether certain facts
constitute legally proscribed official conduct, than by disputes as to what the
facts are.'"278
Notwithstanding the procedural analogies to exclusionary rules which
sanction improper official conduct, the opinion discussed at length one
272. Id. at 889, 533 P.2d at 1042, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 402.
273. Id. at 892, 533 P.2d at 1044, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 404 (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406

U.S. 441, 453 (1972)). Kastigarheld only that immunity from the use of statements (or evidence
derived therefrom) was all that was required to compel such statements over assertion of the

privilege against self-incrimination. By holding that the relief given Coleman by its supervisory
rule made it unnecessary to resolve Coleman's federal constitutional claims, the court did
decide, sub silentio, that Coleman's federal constitutional rights did not allow him to be free of
the ancillary effect of revealing his defenses to a criminal charge as part of his defense in a pretrial probation revocation hearing on related charges, see Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78
(1970), or to be free of having his revocation hearing testimony used for impeachment purposes,
see Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
274. 13 Cal. 3d at 889, 533 P.2d at 1042, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 402.
275. Id.at 891, 533 P.2d at 1043, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 890, 533 P.2d at 1042, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 402.
278. Id.at 890 n.20, 533 P.2d at 1042 n.20, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 402 n.20.
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respect in which the Coleman rule was said to be far less pervasive in
effect.2 79 Clearly inconsistent testimony which a probationer-defendant
volunteers at his trial was made subject to impeachment or rebuttal by his
revocation hearing testimony and its fruits:
[tihe intent of our exclusionary rule. . . is to encourage the fullest
possible truthful disclosure of relevant facts and circumstances at
the revocation hearing by allowing a probationer who does testify
at his revocation hearing nonetheless to enjoy unimpaired the full
protection of the privilege against self-incrimination at his subsequent trial.280
Thus, if a probationer-defendant testified falsely at his revocation hearing,
he risked impeachment and discrediting of his true testimony at trial if the
latter was clearly inconsistent with his prior testimony; if he testified truly at
his revocation hearing but falsely at trial, he risked rebuttal by introduction
of his prior testimony. 28 1 Moreover, a probationer or other witness who
testified falsely at either proceeding would be subject to a potential prosecution for perjury, since "[t]he exclusionary rule applicable to revocation
hearing testimony of a probationer applies only to a prosecution againstthat
probationer which concerns the same conduct as was at issue at the
revocationproceeding."282 This did not mean, however, that by giving any
testimony at trial a probationer-defendant exposed himself to cross-examination concerning prior testimony at the revocation hearing; if the probationer-defendant's trial testimony did not refer to or contradict his prior
283
testimony, the earlier testimony remained excluded from evidentiary use.
And indeed, if in some respect the prosecution was permitted to make use of
279. Id. at 893 n.21, 533 P.2d at 1044 n.21, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 404 n.21. The Coleman court
cited as an example of a more pervasive exclusionary rule the Miranda rule, which requires that
at least illegally obtained admissions themselves, as opposed to evidence derived therefrom, be
excluded from "the prosecution's case in chief in any trial of the victim of the violation ....
"
Id. (citation omitted). Compare Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476, 479 (1966) with
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 445-52 (1974) and the "vicarious" California exclusionary
rule barring illegally seized evidence "from use against anyone," see 13 Cal. 3d at 893 n.21,533
P.2d at 1044 n.21, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 404 n.21 (citing People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d
855 (1955)). The effect of the Coleman rule was analogized to the controversial federal rule of
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), which held that admissions obtained in violation of
Miranda could be used to impeach the inconsistent testimony of a defendant at trial. See 13

Cal. 3d at 893 n.21, 533 P.2d at 1044 n.21, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 404 n.21. Although the Harrisrule
was applicable in California as a matter of California constitutional law at the time Coleman
was decided, see People v. Nudd, 12 Cal. 3d 204, 524 P.2d 844, 115 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1974), it was
later repudiated on the strength of Chief Justice Wright's shift in view regarding the independent effects of the California Constitution. See People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 116, 545 P.2d
272, 281-82, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 369-70 (1976) (Wright, C.J., concurring). See also note 258 and
accompanying text supra.
280. 13 Cal. 3d at 892, 533 P.2d at 1044, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
281. Id. at 893, 533 P.2d at 1044, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
282. Id. at 893 n.21, 533 P.2d at 1044 n.21, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 404 n.21.
283. Id. at 893-94, 533 P.2d at 1045, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 405.
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the prior testimony, its origin could not be revealed in a fashion which
would also disclose the probationer-defendant as a previously convicted
felon.

284

The opinion did leave a few matters unresolved, particularly those
relating to the standard governing the "sound discretion" of a lower court to
schedule a revocation hearing in advance of related criminal proceedings or
to postpone the revocation hearing until after the criminal trial. Chief Justice
Wright appeared to endorse as a general policy the postponement of probation revocation proceedings until after trial on any related charges, but he
took note of the problems posed when a probationer has been arrested and
remains in custody for a violation of probation. In such an instance, the
probationer is entitled to an immediate prerevocation hearing to determine
the validity of his detention.2 85 It was determined to spare the state "the
procedural burden of applying the exclusionary rule to testimony of a
probationer adduced at this early stage of the probation revocation process. "286 The plenary revocation hearing must still be held reasonably
promptly, however, and thus it was left to the lower courts to decide
whether it was more appropriate to hold that hearing in advance of trial, or
to subject the probationer-defendant to the possibly extended delay of a
postponement until after tria.1 8 7 Finally, the opinion held that its exclusion284. Id. at 889 n.19, 533 P.2d at 1042 n.19, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 402 n.19.
285. Id. at 894-95, 533 P.2d at 1045-46, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 405-06.
286. Id. at 896, 533 P.2d at 1046, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
287. Id. at 896-97, 533 P.2d at 1046-47, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 406-07. After stating that it was a
matter for the "sound discretion" of the trial court whether to permit probation revocation
proceedings to commence in advance of the disposition of related criminal proceedings, or,
once revocation proceedings have been commenced, to determine how long the formal revocation hearing may be postponed due to concurrent criminal proceedings, without violating the
probationer's due process right to a reasonably prompt revocation hearing, the Coleman court
added: "We do point out, however, that we view it as entirely consistent with the exclusionary
rule announced herein and its underlying purposes for a probationer, if desirous of obtaining a
speedy resolution of his probation status notwithstanding related criminal liability, to offer to
waive the benefit of this exclusionary rule if the court will allow the probation revocation
hearing to proceed in advance of disposition of the related criminal liability." Id. at 897, 533
P.2d at 1047, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 407. This aspect of Coleman has led a commentator to raise a
critical eyebrow: "Remarkably, the court in Coleman suggested that a defendant could seek a
prompt revocation hearing by waiving his right to the exclusionary rule!" Supreme Court,supra
note 2, at 525 n.53. Presumably the author of the note was surprised that the trial courts, rather
than individual probationers, were given the choice between a pre-trial revocation hearing
under the Coleman rule or postponement until after trial. The Coleman opinion itself endorsed
leaving revocation proceedings uninitiated altogether until after trial disposition of related
criminal charges, and this was what Coleman himself had requested; see note 315 and accompanying text infra. If revocation proceedings were begun, however, and then postponed until
after criminal charges were resolved, there would arise a new tension between constitutional
rights. Lengthy postponement would impinge upon the probationer-defendant's right to a
speedy determination of the revocation proceeding. The court did not determine in Coleman if
this tension could ever reach constitutional proportions, given that no more than a 60-day delay
in trial could occur without the probationer-defendant's waiver of his California constitutional
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ary rule, having been fashioned in the interest of the sound administration
of justice, should for that reason be given prospective effect only. 288 The
order revoking Coleman's probation was reversed, however, without comment on this exception to the rule of prospectivity.2 89
D. Supervisory Discretion
The device of the supervisory rule has its origins in the common law of
evidence, and hence in the simple necessity of courts to regulate the conduct
right to a speedy trial. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15; Sykes v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 83, 507
P.2d 90, 106 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1973). What it did say was that if a probationer felt prejudiced for
lack of speedy determination of his probation status, he could increase his chances of convincing the trial court to order a pre-trial hearing by stipulating that this would not result in his
subsequent contention at trial that adverse evidence was derived from his earlier testimony,
with the prosecution thus subjected to the burden of establishing that its evidence was not so
derived. See 13 Cal. 3d at 891, 533 P.2d at 1043, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 403; see text accompanying
notes 275-76 supra.
This concern with the possible burden to the prosecution in proving that trial evidence was
not derived from earlier revocation hearing testimony also led the court to make the Coleman
rule inapplicable at "prerevocation" hearings to determine if an arrest for violation of probation was justified, even though an adverse ruling at such a hearing could result in a probationer's continued custody without the right to reasonable bail which would obtain if he had
been arrested solely on new criminal charges.
From Dworkin's perspective, this solicitude for the prosecution's burden of complying
with the Coleman rule might be subject to valid criticism, if Coleman had been decided on
constitutional grounds. Some explanation would be necessary as to %xhyprobationers' moral
rights against the state should vary according to the stage of the revocation process or the
"sound discretion" of the trial court in scheduling the revocation hearing. Such a balancing of
the burden to the state against the fairness to an individual is, of course, a large part of current
constitutional law on prisoners' rights, see, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 439 (1974), but
this law may be ill-considered. More important to a Dworkinian analysis is the fact that the
Coleman rule was promulgated as a matter of legislative discretion, not constitutional right,
and, as such, the court was free to decide at what point the policies to be served by the rule
justified limiting its applicability. See notes 295-303 and accompanying text infra.
288. 13 Cal. 3d at 897, 533 P.2d at 1047, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
289. Had Coleman not been given the benefit of the court's new rule, the court would have
had to resolve a ticklish question about whether that rule had indeed made it unnecessary to
resolve Coleman's federal constitutional claims. The United States Supreme Court has always
given the parties to a case breaking new constitutional ground the benefit of its holding, even if
it is otherwise of purely prospective effect, but this practice is "rooted in the command of
Article III of the Constitution that we resolve issues solely in concrete cases or controversies."
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301 (1967). Since California courts are not constitutionally
prohibited from rendering advisory opinions, this constraint had not bound them, and new
rulings had frequently excluded even the parties to the cases in which they were announced
from their immediate benefit. Just three days before Coleman was decided, however, the court
changed course and began granting the parties to a case the benefit of its otherwise prospective
ruling. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 829-30, 532 P.2d 1226, 1244, 119 Cal. Rptr.
858, 876 (1975); id. at 830-32, 532 P.2d at 1245-46, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 877-78 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting). The Coleman court thus did not need to consider whether Coleman would have
been entitled to the immediate benefit of a ruling in his favor on federal constitutional grounds,
even though his immediate benefit from such a ruling by a federal court would have been
attributable in part to the jurisdictional structure of the federal judiciary rather than to the
nature of Coleman's personal rights under the federal Constitution.
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of proceedings before them in the absence of any other source of regulation.2 90 For decades, however, the basic rules of evidence relating to such
matters as relevance, reliability, privilege, and burdens of production and
proof have been settled, and this has encouraged the codification of these
rules in statutory or quasi-statutory form. 29 1 Courts have not, however,
abdicated their own responsibility to control the conduct of judicial proceedings. As the rules governing the admissibility of evidence in terms of its
substance have become codified, judicial attention has turned to the procedure by which that evidence has been obtained.
The most celebrated instances of judicial exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence have held that exclusion was a constitutional right of a
person against whom the evidence was offered. Thus in Weeks v. United
States,292 evidence seized from the defendant by federal agents in violation
of the Fourth Amendment was ruled inadmissible in a federal court; similarly in Mapp v. Ohio,293 it was held that the Fourteenth Amendment, which
had already been construed as making the Fourth Amendment applicable to
the states, required the exclusion of illegally seized evidence from use in the
prosecution of the victim of the Fourth Amendment violation. And in
Miranda v. Arizona,294 admissions obtained during custodial interrogation
from an uncounseled suspect in the absence of prophylactic warnings were
held inadmissible against that suspect on the basis of the Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendments, even though the admissions might otherwise have
been allowed in evidence under traditional constitutional and evidentiary
standards of voluntariness.
The advent of nonconstitutional exclusionary rules promulgated pursuant to supervisory powers has accompanied the growth of these constitutional exclusionary rules. In the federal courts, supervisory rules became a
favored means of establishing and maintaining "civilized standards" of
procedure and evidence without imposing them upon state courts as a matter
of constitutional due process. 295 Thus the United States Supreme Court
justified the exercise of its supervisory authority over the administration of
criminal justice in the federal courts on the theory that it had, since its
inception, propounded rules of evidence to be applied in federal criminal
prosecutions, and that "in formulating such rules of evidence for federal
criminal trials the Court has been guided by considerations of justice not
290. See I J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 8c, at 262 (3d ed. 1940).
291. See generally FED. R. EVID.; CAL. EVID. CODE (West 1976 & Supp. 1977).
292. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
293. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
294. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
295. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943). See also Rea v. United States, 350
U.S. 214 (1956) (federal court ordered to enjoin federal agent from testifying in state court as to
fruits of illegal search).
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limited to the strict canons of evidentiary relevance." 296 Similarly, the
California Supreme Court employed a supervisory rule to exclude illegally
seized evidence from use in California courts long before Mapp made this a
federal constitutional requirement. 297 Supervisory powers have also been
employed to require a complete retrial "to see that the waters of justice are
not polluted" by the "impurity" of perjury, 298 to afford a defendant discovery of exculpatory documents possessed by the prosecution, 299 and to
allow a new trial without any showing of prejudice in a civil case in which
jury selection had been tainted by "class distinctions and discriminations
which are abhorrent to our democratic ideals of trial by jury.'300
All of these cases in which courts have invoked their supervisory
powers to take action not otherwise required by constitution, statute, or
common law rule have offered as justification not the rights of the parties
before them, but "some strong social policy." 30 1 Although variously expressed, the central concern was for the integrity of the administration of
justice. This required concern for the method of adjudication as well as its
outcome; 302 its focus was on the institution of justice rather than on the
participants. 30 3 As such, it was inescapably legislative in nature, and it was
therefore inescapably discretionary.
There is no sound reason to object to this variety of judicial legislation.
Since it involves matters of procedure rather than the substantive relations of
parties, outside the courts, it does not pose the ex post facto problems which
Dworkin attributes to judicial decisions generated by concern for social
policy rather than individual rights. 3°4 Since it involves only participants in
the adjudicatory process, and principally in the criminal justice system, it
affects the immediate interests of a very limited constituency about which
296. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943).
297. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 442, 282 P.2d 905, 910 (1955).
298. Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 14 (1956).
299. People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 585-86, 305 P.2d 1, 13-14 (1956).
300. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220, 225 (1946). See also Communist Party
of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 351 U.S. 115, 124-25 (1956) (supervisory powers invoked to remand case to administrative board over which Court had appellate

jurisdiction, for hearing on allegations of perjured testimony; it was said that "fastidious regard
for the honor of the administration of justice requires the Court to make certain that the doing
of justice be made so manifest that only irrational or perverse claims of its disregard can be
asserted." Id. at 124.).
301. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 755 (1952).
302. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 344 (1943) (procedural requirement of
prompt arraignment "constitutes an important safeguard-not only in assuring protection for
the innocent but also in securing conviction of the guilty by methods that commend themselves
to a progressive and self-confident society.").
303. See People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 445, 282 P.2d 905, 912 (1955) ("Out of regard for
its own dignity as an agency of justice and custodian of liberty the court should not have a hand
in such 'dirty business.' ").
304. See DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 85.

Fall 1977]

JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND JURISPRUDENCE

judges are particularly well informed. In this context the usual arguments of
the superiority of popularly elected legislatures over panels of judges as
mechanisms for balancing competing interests and making law have little
force.10 5 In a broader sense, of course, supervisory rules have a great impact
on the public as a whole, insofar as they affect conviction rates, or litigation
costs, or confidence in law and the courts. But this is hardly objectionable,
as one of the
given the independent constitutional status of the judiciary
3°6
three branches of government, all of equal dignity.
In Dworkin's view, judicial decisionmaking is generally neither legislative nor discretionary because it is addressed to arguments of principle, to
305. See id.
306. Indeed, it has been asserted that the principle of separation of powers is sufficient to
create doubt whether supervisory rules, even though legislative in character, are subject to
legislative repeal. Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationaleand Rescue,
47 GEo. L.J. 1, 41-42 (1958). This seems to have been the view of Justice Roberts, who in a
concurring opinion joined in by Justices Brandeis and Stone, declared that the doctrine of
entrapment is not a defense dependent upon the intent of Congress, but is rather "a fundamental rule of public policy. The protection of its own functions and the preservation of the purity
of its own temple belongs only to the court. It is the province of the court and of the court alone
to protect itself and the government from such prostitution of the criminal law." Sorrells v.
United States, 287 U.S. 435, 457 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring).
The issue of whether there is inherent judicial power to acquit an entrapped defendant has
continued to divide successive generations of justices of the United States Supreme Court. In
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958), Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justices Douglas,
Harlan, and Brennan, expressly adopted Justice Roberts' position in Sorrells and cited the
subsequently evolved doctrine of supervisory powers as the basis for the inherent power
articulated by Justice Roberts. Id. at 378-85 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result). In
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 428-36 (1973), the Court held by a bare majority of five
to four that Justice Roberts' arguments in Sorrells should not be adopted, and that the defense
of entrapment was a creature of congressional intent rather than judicial authority. In Russell,
however, Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court left open whether the conduct of the police
might ever be "so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government
" 411 U.S. at 431-32 (citation
from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction ....
omitted). When Justice Rehnquist sought to extend Russell to a per se rule that a defendant
predisposed to crime could never invoke the entrapment defense, no matter how outrageous the
governmental conduct encouraging the crime, he lost his majority. Hampton v. United States,
425 U.S. 484, 488-91 (1976) (plurality opinion). Justice Powell, joined by Justice Blackmun,
insisted that it remained an open question whether due process rights or the Court's supervisory
powers might be the basis for acquittal of even a predisposed defendant entrapped through
outrageous police conduct. 425 U.S. at 492-95 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice
Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall, expressly stated that the defendant in
Hampton should be acquitted "under our supervisory power," without reaching whether the
police conduct there in issue was foreclosed to the states under the due process clause. 425 U.S.
at 500 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Cf. Esteybar v. Municipal Court, 5 Cal. 3d 119, 485 P.2d
1140, 95 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1971) (Wright, C.J.): "Since the exercise of ajudicial power may not be
conditioned upon the approval of either the executive or legislative branches of government,"
the California Constitution's guarantee of separation of powers did not permit the legislature to
condition the power of a magistrate to reduce a charge from a felony to a misdemeanor only
with the consent of the district attorney. Id. at 127, 485 P.2d at 1145, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 529.
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the status of individuals vis-h-vis each other and the state, and because it
strives for consistency in its treatment of individuals and in its reasoning
about their rights. 3°7 Judicial exercise of supervisory powers does not depart
entirely from this model. As Reynolds indicated, courts must be more
concerned with ensuring fair treatment of individuals through supervisory
rules than with ensuring fair treatment of the government, which has at its
command the traditional legislative means to serve the interests of the public
through the medium of the state. 30 8 While Coleman indicates that justification and consistency are still powerful and desirable influences on judicial
rulemaking even in a legislative capacity, 30 9 this judicial gloss on judicial
legislation cannot conceal its fundamentally discretionary aspect.
Although often inspired by constitutional values or statutory policies,
supervisory rules by their very terms are ad hoc adjustments to the judicial
process. There are obviously manifold areas where that process could be
altered to yield more perfect justice. Every adjustment is not a matter of
constitutional right; beyond some minimum, further improvement requires
legislative judgment, a balancing of social cost versus social gain. We have
always recognized a legislative capacity for court reform, from the Field
Code of 1848 to today's small claim courts. When legislative reforms occur,
the fact of the reform does not establish that its beneficiaries were entitled to
it all along, or that the legislature was wrong for not enacting it earlier. This
process of choice is the same when judges address the problem of court
reform. Although the proper scope of their concern is far more limited,
judges too must make choices and weigh alternatives when considering if
action not otherwise required is in the interests of justice. As Coleman
illustrates, such choices are not uncommonly posed by hard cases of criminal procedure, and Chief Justice Wright responded admirably.
When it is accepted that supervisory powers are discretionary, that they
serve larger ends than the vindication of the immediate rights of the litigants
before the court, the Coleman case can be fully appreciated. Its beauty is in
its balance. The opinion itself styles its exclusionary rule as less than
pervasive in effect by permitting use of revocation hearing testimony for
purposes of impeachment. 310 In copious detail, however, the opinion imposes requirements of genuine and premeditated inconsistency before the
exclusionary rule may be overcome. 311 Chief Justice Wright sets out at
length the procedures governing its assertion and enforcement, demonstrat307. See text accompanying notes 81-85 supra.
308. Reynolds v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 834, 845-46, 528 P.2d 45, 52-53, 117 Cal. Rptr.
437, 444-45; see text accompanying note 264 supra.

309. See, e.g., 13 Cal. 3d at 890 n.20, 533 P.2d at 1042 n.20, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 402 n.20.
310. See 13 Cal. 3d at 893 n.21, 533 P.2d at 1044 n.21, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 404 n.21.
311. See id. at 889, 893-94, 533 P.2d at 1042, 1044-45, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 402, 404-05.
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312
ing their basis in precedent and explaining their operation in practice.
Notwithstanding this dedication to clarity, his opinion appreciates the burden it may impose upon the prosecution to show that its evidence was not
derived from pre-trial revocation hearing testimony, and strives to reduce
31 3
that burden by making the rule inapplicable to prerevocation hearings.
Finally, and most important, it leaves scheduling discretion to the trial
courts. 3 14 Coleman himself had requested the creation of a per se rule
requiring that revocation hearings be postponed until disposition of related
criminal charges, and the court's failure to discuss this alternative has been
justly criticized. 3 15 But as that commentary points out, important competing
interests bear on the scheduling decision, and a per se rule would have
3 16
prejudiced considerations of public safety and prosecutorial efficiency.

All of these elements establishing a balance between fairness to probationer-defendants and to the public interest in an unburdened prosecutor
would be cause for concern if Coleman had been decided on constitutional
grounds, and if constitutional rights were in the balance rather than discretionary efforts to improve the machinery of justice. Use of the supervisory
rule to serve such public as well as private purposes was familiar to Chief
Justice Wright, however. He had previously ruled that admissions made in
juvenile court proceedings were inadmissible in a related criminal prosecution, on the basis of a policy of encouraging the settlement of criminal cases
through cooperation with juvenile authorities. 317 He had also propounded a
judicially declared rule of criminal procedure entitling probationers to retained or appointed counsel to assist them at revocation proceedings, finding
public as well as private interests served by the contribution of counsel to
orderly and just proceedings. 318 Nor was he irrevocably committed to
supervisory rulings only when they benefited defendants; a few months after
Coleman was decided he was to write an opinion discarding a longstanding
cautionary instruction reflecting adversely on the credibility of the prosecutrix in sex offense cases. 319 In all of these cases, as in Coleman, supervisory
rules were employed to serve public policy as well as individual interests; in
all of these rulings, as in Coleman, the court acted with authority, resolving
hard cases and nagging problems without a single dissenting vote.
312.
313.
314.
315.

See id. at 889-92, 533 P.2d at 1042-44, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 402-04.
See id. at 896, 533 P.2d at 1046, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
See id. at 897, 533 P.2d at 1047, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
See Supreme Court, supra note 2, at 523.

316. See id. at 523-27.
317. Bryan v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 575, 498 P.2d 1079, 102 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1972).
318. People v. Vickers, 8 Cal. 3d 451, 503 P.2d 1313, 105 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1972).
319. People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 538 P.2d 247, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1975).
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In these decisions, Chief Justice Wright and his colleagues displayed
the informed discretion necessary to advance the cause of justice. These
rulings demonstrate that one way to approach hard cases of criminal procedure is to formulate discretionary solutions through supervisory rules; they
also demonstrate that Chief Justice Wright employed such discretion as the
legislative instrument it is, balancing the advancement of social goals
against newly created individual rights. But, one might ask, where is the
valor which I promised to find in Chief Justice Wright's discretion?

Conclusion
This essay has not addressed whether judges deciding constitutional
cases in a court of last resort have discretion in their decisions. Certainly
their conduct is not unbridled. I doubt that Hart ever meant to suggest that it
was, and Dworkin has demonstrated that it surely is not. But it is quite
another matter to assert, as Dworkin has, that judicial obligation in deciding
constitutional cases, no matter how doubtful, displaces all discretion. It is a
moot point with regard to the Coleman case; I suspect for practical reasons
that it is a moot point altogether.
It is useful to argue against discretion in order to impress upon judges
their obligation to act in a conscientious manner, but it does not inform us
how judges cope with their limitations as human beings possessing finite
time and resources. Hard cases pose problems of judicial candor and
institutional error which often control their outcomes, despite the best
intentions of the deciding judges. The candor of judges in acknowledging
the inconsistency of inconvenient precedent, to themselves as well as to the
colleagues for whom they may be drafting an opinion, will have a significant impact on the decision of the court. The readiness of judges to declare
precedent mistaken is equally significant and equally imponderable; when
they give grudging interpretations to precedent they are unwilling to overrule forthrightly, they condone implicitly the tendency to disregard precedent. This subtle debasement of the concept of stare decisis increases the
apparent discretion with which decisions are reached.
However debatable the propriety of judicial discretion in constitutional
adjudication, and regardless of whether decisionmaking without discretion
is considered the ideal of adjudication, it is indisputable that the perceived
constraints of precedent and principle will shield no judge against public and
political outcry at an unpopular decision. When judges do take rights
seriously, as Chief Justice Wright did,-they must truly possess courage as
well as convictions. Chief Justice Wright's courage in constitutional cases is
beyond dispute, and it was a courage born of a sense of duty. As he wrote
320
after his decision invalidating the death penalty in California:
320. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972).
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I do not claim the infallibility of court decisions that attack particular legislation. Some such decisions, I am certain, are written in
good faith error, and men of integrity are always compelled to
express their differing views on the merits of court action. Such
attacks on the correctness of certain decisions invalidating legislation caution me to exercise great care but do not disturb me. I am
disturbed, however, by attacks that go beyond the merits of issues
and challenge the compulsion imposed upon the court and even the
court's right to examine and reexamine legislation in light of prevailing constitutional tests ...
• . . You may, if you wish, disagree with us on the merits, but
you should not challenge our right and our duty to make the
determinations
3 2 on the constitutional problem with which we were
confronted. 1
For Chief Justice Wright, then, the duty was to decide, to confront the
as
issues, to measure them against precedent and principle and to rule 322
seemed fit. It was a process which could produce a "good faith error"
and called for an " 'ordeal of judgment [which] cannot be shirked.' "323
Part of the process was to have the courage to take small steps when the
footing was unsound. When rights were in doubt, it was necessary to resort
to legislation, advancing the public interest in a balanced way when it could
not or need not be decided that some improvement on justice was a matter of
right instead of good sense and sound policy. If there is anything Dworkin has shown, it is that the march of
constitutional progress is taken one step at a time. Even when there is some
signal advance, if it is appropriately justified in institutional history and
political morality, it will proceed along stepping stones of precedent and
principle already laid down in the flow of adjudication and the evolution of
society. Cases such as Coleman fulfill this function well, advancing constitutional values with moderation and unanimity, treading softly to test new
ground for support. If secure footing is found, what has proved reasonable
and workable quite naturally acquires a vested status; possession of the new
ground ripens into title and a claim once novel becomes a right.
That this is happening in the aftermath of Coleman is clear from two of
Chief Justice Wright's final opinions. In Allen v. Superior Court,324 the
solicitude for Fifth Amendment values described in Coleman and Reynolds
culminated in an independent construction of the state constitution to give
greater protection against self-incrimination than that required by the federal
Constitution. In Daly v. Superior Court,325 Coleman was described as
321. Wright, The Role of the Judiciary: From Marbury to Anderson; 60 CALIF. L. REV.
1262, 1262-63, 1274 (1972).
322. Id. at 1263.
323. Id. at 1275 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 104 (1958)).
324. 18 Cal. 3d 520, 557 P.2d 65, 134 Cal. Rptr. 774 (1976).
325. 19 Cal. 3d 132, 560 P.2d 1193, 137 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1977).
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setting forth not a mere supervisory rule but a "judicial grant of immunity, '"326 a term of constitutional art which implies that Coleman is gaining
constitutional standing. The time may be ripe to deal with the rights left
dangling in Coleman3 27 -the trail has been blazed.
Thus I conclude that Chief Justice Wright showed valor not only in the
context of constitutional adjudication, where discretion is debatable, but
also in his use of supervisory powers, where discretion is undeniable. The
courage of conviction which he brought to constitutional cases cannot be
minimized, but it was matched in his more subtle exercise of supervisory
powers. Emboldened by a sense of duty and restrained by a sense of
fallibility, patiently marshalling support for initiatives in the administration
of justice, he used judicial legislation to test improvements in adjudicatory
procedure, and carried the court with him through his reasonableness and
humility. Dworkin's Hercules could learn from Chief Justice Wright, for his
contributions to criminal procedure serve "as a useful reminder to any judge
that he might well be wrong in his political judgments, and that he should
therefore decide hard cases with humility. ' 328 Chief Justice Wright is, in
person even more than in opinion, a very humble man. That humility, more
than his office, allowed his courage to be catching and inspired his colleagues to join in exploration of new paths in the law. He no longer controls the
course of the law, but his opinions remain to beckon his successors in the
right direction.
326. Id. at 146, 560 P.2d at 1202, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
327. The Coleman rule appears to have had little effect in deterring the routine scheduling
of revocation hearings in advance of trial on related charges. One court of appeal has gone so
far as to state that the language in Coleman encouraging postponement of revocation hearings
in such circumstances "is of little, if any, consequence" because the Coleman court did not
make postponement mandatory. People v. Sharp, 58 Cal. App. 3d 126, 129, 129 Cal. Rptr. 476,
478 (1976). The same court went on to approve the practice of the San Francisco Superior Court
of setting "virtually all probation revocation hearings prior to trial, without exercising discretion in each case." Id. at 130 & n.1, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 478 & n.1.
328. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 130.

